Year	Annual Percentage Change
	in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire	in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire	in S&P 500 with Dividends Included
1965	23.8	49.5	10.0
1966	20.3	(3.4)	(11.7)
1967	11.0	13.3	30.9
1968	19.0	77.8	11.0
1969	16.2	19.4	(8.4)
1970	12.0	(4.6)	3.9
1971	16.4	80.5	14.6
1972	21.7	8.1	18.9
1973	4.7	(2.5)	(14.8)
1974	5.5	(48.7)	(26.4)
1975	21.9	2.5	37.2
1976	59.3	129.3	23.6
1977	31.9	46.8	(7.4)
1978	24.0	14.5	6.4
1979	35.7	102.5	18.2
1980	19.3	32.8	32.3
1981	31.4	31.8	(5.0)
1982	40.0	38.4	21.4
1983	32.3	69.0	22.4
1984	13.6	(2.7)	6.1
1985	48.2	93.7	31.6
1986	26.1	14.2	18.6
1987	19.5	4.6	5.1
1988	20.1	59.3	16.6
1989	44.4	84.6	31.7
1990	7.4	(23.1)	(3.1)
1991	39.6	35.6	30.5
1992	20.3	29.8	7.6
1993	14.3	38.9	10.1
1994	13.9	25.0	1.3
1995	43.1	57.4	37.6
1996	31.8	6.2	23.0
1997	34.1	34.9	33.4
1998	48.3	52.2	28.6
1999	0.5	(19.9)	21.0
2000	6.5	26.6	(9.1)
2001	(6.2)	6.5	(11.9)
2002	10.0	(3.8)	(22.1)
2003	21.0	15.8	28.7
2004	10.5	4.3	10.9
2005	6.4	0.8	4.9
2006	18.4	24.1	15.8
2007	11.0	28.7	5.5
2008	(9.6)	(31.8)	(37.0)
2009	19.8	2.7	26.5
2010	13.0	21.4	15.1
2011	4.6	(4.7)	2.1
2012	14.4	16.8	16.0
2013	18.2	32.7	32.4
2014	8.3	27.0	13.7
2015	6.4	(12.5)	1.4
2016	10.7	23.4	12.0
2017	23.0	21.9	21.8
2018	0.4	2.8	(4.4)
Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-2018	18.7%	20.5%	9.7%
Overall Gain – 1964-2018	1,091,899%	2,472,627%	15,019%

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire's results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Berkshire earned \$4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called “GAAP”). The components of that figure are \$24.8 billion in operating earnings, a \$3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), \$2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a \$20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.

A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire's Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as “wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.”

The accuracy of that prediction can be suggested by our quarterly results during 2018. In the first and fourth quarters, we reported GAAP losses of \$1.1 billion and \$25.4 billion respectively. In the second and third quarters, we reported profits of \$12 billion and \$18.5 billion. In complete contrast to these gyrations, the many businesses that Berkshire owns delivered consistent and satisfactory operating earnings in all quarters. For the year, those earnings exceeded their 2016 high of \$17.6 billion by 41%.

Wide swings in our quarterly GAAP earnings will inevitably continue. That's because our huge equity portfolio – valued at nearly \$173 billion at the end of 2018 – will often experience one-day price fluctuations of \$2 billion or more, all of which the new rule says must be dropped immediately to our bottom line. Indeed, in the fourth quarter, a period of high volatility in stock prices, we experienced several days with a “profit” or “loss” of more than \$4 billion.

Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire's per-share book value. It's now time to abandon that practice.

The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire's book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant repurchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.

In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire's market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire's stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Before moving on, I want to give you some good news – really good news – that is not reflected in our financial statements. It concerns the management changes we made in early 2018, when Ajit Jain was put in charge of all insurance activities and Greg Abel was given authority over all other operations. These moves were overdue. Berkshire is now far better managed than when I alone was supervising operations. Ajit and Greg have rare talents, and Berkshire blood flows through their veins.

Now let's take a look at what you own.

Focus on the Forest – Forget the Trees

Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic “trees,” so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.

Fortunately, it's not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire's intrinsic business value. That's because our forest contains five “groves” of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.

Before we look more closely at the first four groves, let me remind you of our prime goal in the deployment of your capital: to buy ably-managed businesses, in whole or part, that possess favorable and durable economic characteristics. We also need to make these purchases at sensible prices.

Sometimes we can buy control of companies that meet our tests. Far more often, we find the attributes we seek in publicly-traded businesses, in which we normally acquire a 5% to 10% interest. Our two-pronged approach to huge-scale capital allocation is rare in corporate America and, at times, gives us an important advantage.

In recent years, the sensible course for us to follow has been clear: Many stocks have offered far more for our money than we could obtain by purchasing businesses in their entirety. That disparity led us to buy about \$43 billion of marketable equities last year, while selling only \$19 billion. Charlie and I believe the companies in which we invested offered excellent value, far exceeding that available in takeover transactions.

Despite our recent additions to marketable equities, the most valuable grove in Berkshire's forest remains the many dozens of non-insurance businesses that Berkshire controls (usually with 100% ownership and never with less than 80%). Those subsidiaries earned \$16.8 billion last year. When we say “earned,” moreover, we are describing what remains after all income taxes, interest payments, managerial compensation (whether cash or stock-based), restructuring expenses, depreciation, amortization and home-office overhead.

That brand of earnings is a far cry from that frequently touted by Wall Street bankers and corporate CEOs. Too often, their presentations feature “adjusted EBITDA,” a measure that redefines “earnings” to exclude a variety of all-too-real costs.

For example, managements sometimes assert that their company's stock-based compensation shouldn't be counted as an expense. (What else could it be – a gift from shareholders?) And restructuring expenses? Well, maybe last year's exact rearrangement won't recur. But restructurings of one sort or another are common in business – Berkshire has gone down that road dozens of times, and our shareholders have always borne the costs of doing so.

Abraham Lincoln once posed the question: “If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does it have?” and then answered his own query: “Four, because calling a tail a leg doesn’t make it one.” Abe would have felt lonely on Wall Street.

Charlie and I do contend that our acquisition-related amortization expenses of \$1.4 billion (detailed on page K-84) are not a true economic cost. We add back such amortization “costs” to GAAP earnings when we are evaluating both private businesses and marketable stocks.

In contrast, Berkshire’s \$8.4 billion depreciation charge understates our true economic cost. In fact, we need to spend more than this sum annually to simply remain competitive in our many operations. Beyond those “maintenance” capital expenditures, we spend large sums in pursuit of growth. Overall, Berkshire invested a record \$14.5 billion last year in plant, equipment and other fixed assets, with 89% of that spent in America.

Berkshire's runner-up grove by value is its collection of equities, typically involving a 5% to 10% ownership position in a very large company. As noted earlier, our equity investments were worth nearly \$173 billion at yearend, an amount far above their cost. If the portfolio had been sold at its yearend valuation, federal income tax of about \$14.7 billion would have been payable on the gain. In all likelihood, we will hold most of these stocks for a long time. Eventually, however, gains generate taxes at whatever rate prevails at the time of sale.

Our investees paid us dividends of \$3.8 billion last year, a sum that will increase in 2019. Far more important than the dividends, though, are the huge earnings that are annually retained by these companies. Consider, as an indicator, these figures that cover only our five largest holdings.

Company	Yearend Ownership	Berkshire’s Share in $ millions of
		Dividends(1)	Retained Earnings(2)
American Express	17.9%	$ 237	$ 997
Apple	5.4%	745	2,502
Bank of America	9.5%	551	2,096
Coca-Cola	9.4%	624	(21)
Wells Fargo	9.8%	809	1,263
Total		$2,966	$6,837

(1) Based on current annual rate.
(2) Based on 2018 earnings minus common and preferred dividends paid.

GAAP – which dictates the earnings we report – does not allow us to include the retained earnings of investees in our financial accounts. But those earnings are of enormous value to us: Over the years, earnings retained by our investees (viewed as a group) have eventually delivered capital gains to Berkshire that totaled more than one dollar for each dollar these companies reinvested for us.

All of our major holdings enjoy excellent economics, and most use a portion of their retained earnings to repurchase their shares. We very much like that: If Charlie and I think an investee's stock is underpriced, we rejoice when management employs some of its earnings to increase Berkshire's ownership percentage.

Here's one example drawn from the table above: Berkshire's holdings of American Express have remained unchanged over the past eight years. Meanwhile, our ownership increased from 12.6% to 17.9% because of repurchases made by the company. Last year, Berkshire's portion of the \$6.9 billion earned by American Express was \$1.2 billion, about 96% of the \$1.3 billion we paid for our stake in the company. When earnings increase and shares outstanding decrease, owners – over time – usually do well.

A third category of Berkshire's business ownership is a quartet of companies in which we share control with other parties. Our portion of the after-tax operating earnings of these businesses – 26.7% of Kraft Heinz, 50% of Berkadia and Electric Transmission Texas, and 38.6% of Pilot Flying J – totaled about \$1.3 billion in 2018.

In our fourth grove, Berkshire held \$112 billion at yearend in U.S. Treasury bills and other cash equivalents, and another \$20 billion in miscellaneous fixed-income instruments. We consider a portion of that stash to be untouchable, having pledged to always hold at least \$20 billion in cash equivalents to guard against external calamities. We have also promised to avoid any activities that could threaten our maintaining that buffer.

Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash.

In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects.

That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 – I'm the young one – that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie's to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.)

My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I believe Berkshire's intrinsic value can be approximated by summing the values of our four asset-laden groves and then subtracting an appropriate amount for taxes eventually payable on the sale of marketable securities.

You may ask whether an allowance should not also be made for the major tax costs Berkshire would incur if we were to sell certain of our wholly-owned businesses. Forget that thought: It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.

The interest cost on all of our debt has been deducted as an expense in calculating the earnings at Berkshire's non-insurance businesses. Beyond that, much of our ownership of the first four groves is financed by funds generated from Berkshire's fifth grove – a collection of exceptional insurance companies. We call those funds “float,” a source of financing that we expect to be cost-free – or maybe even better than that – over time. We will explain the characteristics of float later in this letter.

Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire's value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.

At Berkshire, the whole is greater – considerably greater – than the sum of the parts.

Repurchases and Reporting

Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire's intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.

True, the upside from repurchases is very slight for those who are leaving. That's because careful buying by us will minimize any impact on Berkshire's stock price. Nevertheless, there is some benefit to sellers in having an extra buyer in the market.

For continuing shareholders, the advantage is obvious: If the market prices a departing partner's interest at, say, 90¢ on the dollar, continuing shareholders reap an increase in per-share intrinsic value with every repurchase by the company. Obviously, repurchases should be price-sensitive: Blindly buying an overpriced stock is value-destructive, a fact lost on many promotional or ever-optimistic CEOs.

When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it's vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed.

Some sellers, however, may disagree with our calculation of value and others may have found investments that they consider more attractive than Berkshire shares. Some of that second group will be right: There are unquestionably many stocks that will deliver far greater gains than ours.

In addition, certain shareholders will simply decide it's time for them or their families to become net consumers rather than continuing to build capital. Charlie and I have no current interest in joining that group. Perhaps we will become big spenders in our old age.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results.

Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets. I, of course, regularly view the monthly financial reports of most subsidiaries. But Charlie and I learn of Berkshire's overall earnings and financial position only on a quarterly basis.

Furthermore, Berkshire has no company-wide budget (though many of our subsidiaries find one useful). Our lack of such an instrument means that the parent company has never had a quarterly “number” to hit. Shunning the use of this bogey sends an important message to our many managers, reinforcing the culture we prize.

Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an “innocent” fudge in order to not disappoint “the Street” – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a “cookie-jar” reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers “just this once” may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.

At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.

Non-Insurance Operations – From Lollipops to Locomotives

Let's now look further at Berkshire's most valuable grove – our collection of non-insurance businesses – keeping in mind that we do not wish to unnecessarily hand our competitors information that might be useful to them. Additional details about individual operations can be found on pages K-5 – K-22 and pages K-40 – K-51.

Viewed as a group, these businesses earned pre-tax income in 2018 of \$20.8 billion, a 24% increase over 2017. Acquisitions we made in 2018 delivered only a trivial amount of that gain.

I will stick with pre-tax figures in this discussion. But our after-tax gain in 2018 from these businesses was far greater – 47% – thanks in large part to the cut in the corporate tax rate that became effective at the beginning of that year. Let’s look at why the impact was so dramatic.

Begin with an economic reality: Like it or not, the U.S. Government “owns” an interest in Berkshire’s earnings of a size determined by Congress. In effect, our country’s Treasury Department holds a special class of our stock – call this holding the AA shares – that receives large “dividends” (that is, tax payments) from Berkshire. In 2017, as in many years before, the corporate tax rate was 35%, which meant that the Treasury was doing very well with its AA shares. Indeed, the Treasury’s “stock,” which was paying nothing when we took over in 1965, had evolved into a holding that delivered billions of dollars annually to the federal government.

Last year, however, 40% of the government's “ownership” (14/35 $^{ths}$ ) was returned to Berkshire – free of charge – when the corporate tax rate was reduced to 21%. Consequently, our “A” and “B” shareholders received a major boost in the earnings attributable to their shares.

This happening materially increased the intrinsic value of the Berkshire shares you and I own. The same dynamic, moreover, enhanced the intrinsic value of almost all of the stocks Berkshire holds.

Those are the headlines. But there are other factors to consider that tempered our gain. For example, the tax benefits garnered by our large utility operation get passed along to its customers. Meanwhile, the tax rate applicable to the substantial dividends we receive from domestic corporations is little changed at about 13%. (This lower rate has long been logical because our investees have already paid tax on the earnings that they pay to us.) Overall, however, the new law made our businesses and the stocks we own considerably more valuable.

Which suggests that we return to the performance of our non-insurance businesses. Our two towering redwoods in this grove are BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (90.9% owned). Combined, they earned \$9.3 billion before tax last year, up 6% from 2017. You can read more about these businesses on pages K-5 – K-10 and pages K-40 – K-45.

Our next five non-insurance subsidiaries, as ranked by earnings (but presented here alphabetically), Clayton Homes, International Metalworking, Lubrizol, Marmon and Precision Castparts, had aggregate pre-tax income in 2018 of \$6.4 billion, up from the \$5.5 billion these companies earned in 2017.

The next five, similarly ranked and listed (Forest River, Johns Manville, MiTek, Shaw and TTI) earned \$2.4 billion pre-tax last year, up from \$2.1 billion in 2017.

The remaining non-insurance businesses that Berkshire owns – and there are many – had pre-tax income of \$3.6 billion in 2018 vs. \$3.3 billion in 2017.

Insurance, "Float," and the Funding of Berkshire

Our property/casualty (“P/C”) insurance business – our fifth grove – has been the engine propelling Berkshire’s growth since 1967, the year we acquired National Indemnity and its sister company, National Fire & Marine, for \$8.6 million. Today, National Indemnity is the largest property/casualty company in the world as measured by net worth.

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry's business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.

This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how it has grown, as the following table shows:

Year	Float (in millions)*
1970	$ 39
1980	237
1990	1,632
2000	27,871
2010	65,832
2018	122,732

* Includes float arising from life, annuity and health insurance businesses.

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or near-term demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.

If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, our insurance operation registers an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income the float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money – and, better yet, get paid for holding it.

Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous indeed that it sometimes causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. That loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry, despite the float income all its companies enjoy, will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns on tangible net worth as compared to other American businesses.

Nevertheless, I like our own prospects. Berkshire's unrivaled financial strength allows us far more flexibility in investing our float than that generally available to P/C companies. The many alternatives available to us are always an advantage and occasionally offer major opportunities. When other insurers are constrained, our choices expand.

Moreover, our P/C companies have an excellent underwriting record. Berkshire has now operated at an underwriting profit for 15 of the past 16 years, the exception being 2017, when our pre-tax loss was \$3.2 billion. For the entire 16-year span, our pre-tax gain totaled \$27 billion, of which \$2 billion was recorded in 2018.

That record is no accident: Disciplined risk evaluation is the daily focus of our insurance managers, who know that the benefits of float can be drowned by poor underwriting results. All insurers give that message lip service. At Berkshire it is a religion, Old Testament style.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

In most cases, the funding of a business comes from two sources – debt and equity. At Berkshire, we have two additional arrows in the quiver to talk about, but let's first address the conventional components.

We use debt sparingly. Many managers, it should be noted, will disagree with this policy, arguing that significant debt juices the returns for equity owners. And these more venturesome CEOs will be right most of the time.

At rare and unpredictable intervals, however, credit vanishes and debt becomes financially fatal. A Russian-roulette equation – usually win, occasionally die – may make financial sense for someone who gets a piece of a company’s upside but does not share in its downside. But that strategy would be madness for Berkshire. Rational people don’t risk what they have and need for what they don’t have and don’t need.

Most of the debt you see on our consolidated balance sheet – see page K-65 – resides at our railroad and energy subsidiaries, both of them asset-heavy companies. During recessions, the cash generation of these businesses remains bountiful. The debt they use is both appropriate for their operations and not guaranteed by Berkshire.

Our level of equity capital is a different story: Berkshire’s \$349 billion is unmatched in corporate America. By retaining all earnings for a very long time, and allowing compound interest to work its magic, we have amassed funds that have enabled us to purchase and develop the valuable groves earlier described. Had we instead followed a 100% payout policy, we would still be working with the \$22 million with which we began fiscal 1965.

Beyond using debt and equity, Berkshire has benefitted in a major way from two less-common sources of corporate funding. The larger is the float I have described. So far, those funds, though they are recorded as a huge net liability on our balance sheet, have been of more utility to us than an equivalent amount of equity. That's because they have usually been accompanied by underwriting earnings. In effect, we have been paid in most years for holding and using other people's money.

As I have often done before, I will emphasize that this happy outcome is far from a sure thing: Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years to surface. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as a hurricane or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a megacatastrophe strikes, we will get our share of the losses and they will be big – very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, we will be looking to add business the next day.

The final funding source – which again Berkshire possesses to an unusual degree – is deferred income taxes. These are liabilities that we will eventually pay but that are meanwhile interest-free.

As I indicated earlier, about \$14.7 billion of our \$50.5 billion of deferred taxes arises from the unrealized gains in our equity holdings. These liabilities are accrued in our financial statements at the current 21% corporate tax rate but will be paid at the rates prevailing when our investments are sold. Between now and then, we in effect have an interest-free “loan” that allows us to have more money working for us in equities than would otherwise be the case.

A further \$28.3 billion of deferred tax results from our being able to accelerate the depreciation of assets such as plant and equipment in calculating the tax we must currently pay. The front-ended savings in taxes that we record gradually reverse in future years. We regularly purchase additional assets, however. As long as the present tax law prevails, this source of funding should trend upward.

Over time, Berkshire's funding base – that's the right-hand side of our balance sheet – should grow, primarily through the earnings we retain. Our job is to put the money retained to good use on the left-hand side, by adding attractive assets.

GEICO and Tony Nicely

That title says it all: The company and the man are inseparable.

Tony joined GEICO in 1961 at the age of 18; I met him in the mid-1970s. At that time, GEICO, after a four-decade record of both rapid growth and outstanding underwriting results, suddenly found itself near bankruptcy. A recently-installed management had grossly underestimated GEICO's loss costs and consequently underpriced its product. It would take many months until those loss-generating policies on GEICO's books – there were no less than 2.3 million of them – would expire and could then be repriced. The company's net worth in the meantime was rapidly approaching zero.

In 1976, Jack Byrne was brought in as CEO to rescue GEICO. Soon after his arrival, I met him, concluded that he was the perfect man for the job, and began to aggressively buy GEICO shares. Within a few months, Berkshire bought about $\frac{1}{3}$ of the company, a portion that later grew to roughly $\frac{1}{2}$ without our spending a dime. That stunning accretion occurred because GEICO, after recovering its health, consistently repurchased its shares. All told, this half-interest in GEICO cost Berkshire \$47 million, about what you might pay today for a trophy apartment in New York.

Let's now fast-forward 17 years to 1993, when Tony Nicely was promoted to CEO. At that point, GEICO's reputation and profitability had been restored – but not its growth. Indeed, at yearend 1992 the company had only 1.9 million auto policies on its books, far less than its pre-crisis high. In sales volume among U.S. auto insurers, GEICO then ranked an undistinguished seventh.

Late in 1995, after Tony had re-energized GEICO, Berkshire made an offer to buy the remaining 50% of the company for \$2.3 billion, about 50 times what we had paid for the first half (and people say I never pay up!). Our offer was successful and brought Berkshire a wonderful, but underdeveloped, company and an equally wonderful CEO, who would move GEICO forward beyond my dreams.

GEICO is now America's Number Two auto insurer, with sales 1,200% greater than it recorded in 1995. Underwriting profits have totaled \$15.5 billion (pre-tax) since our purchase, and float available for investment has grown from \$2.5 billion to \$22.1 billion.

By my estimate, Tony's management of GEICO has increased Berkshire's intrinsic value by more than \$50 billion. On top of that, he is a model for everything a manager should be, helping his 40,000 associates to identify and polish abilities they didn't realize they possessed.

Last year, Tony decided to retire as CEO, and on June $30^{\text{th}}$ he turned that position over to Bill Roberts, his long-time partner. I've known and watched Bill operate for several decades, and once again Tony made the right move. Tony remains Chairman and will be helpful to GEICO for the rest of his life. He's incapable of doing less.

All Berkshire shareholders owe Tony their thanks. I head the list.

Investments

Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value. We exclude our Kraft Heinz holding – 325,442,152 shares – because Berkshire is part of a control group and therefore must account for this investment on the “equity” method. On its balance sheet, Berkshire carries its Kraft Heinz holding at a GAAP figure of \$13.8 billion, an amount reduced by our share of the large write-off of intangible assets taken by Kraft Heinz in 2018. At yearend, our Kraft Heinz holding had a market value of \$14 billion and a cost basis of \$9.8 billion.

Shares*	Company	Percentage of Company Owned	12/31/18
			Cost**	Market
			(in millions)
151,610,700	American Express Company	17.9	$ 1,287	$ 14,452
255,300,329	Apple Inc.	5.4	36,044	40,271
918,919,000	Bank of America Corp.	9.5	11,650	22,642
84,488,751	The Bank of New York Mellon Corp.	8.8	3,860	3,977
6,789,054	Charter Communications, Inc.	3.0	1,210	1,935
400,000,000	The Coca-Cola Company	9.4	1,299	18,940
65,535,000	Delta Air Lines, Inc.	9.6	2,860	3,270
18,784,698	The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.	4.9	2,380	3,138
50,661,394	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	1.5	5,605	4,946
24,669,778	Moody’s Corporation	12.9	248	3,455
47,890,899	Southwest Airlines Co.	8.7	2,005	2,226
21,938,642	United Continental Holdings Inc.	8.1	1,195	1,837
146,346,999	U.S. Bancorp	9.1	5,548	6,688
43,387,980	USG Corporation	31.0	836	1,851
449,349,102	Wells Fargo & Company	9.8	10,639	20,706
	Others		16,201	22,423
	Total Common Stocks Carried at Market		$ 102,867	$ 172,757

* Excludes shares held by pension funds of Berkshire subsidiaries.
** This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.

Charlie and I do not view the \$172.8 billion detailed above as a collection of ticker symbols – a financial dalliance to be terminated because of downgrades by “the Street,” expected Federal Reserve actions, possible political developments, forecasts by economists or whatever else might be the subject du jour.

What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning about 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.

Returns of that order by large, established and understandable businesses are remarkable under any circumstances. They are truly mind-blowing when compared against the return that many investors have accepted on bonds over the last decade – 3% or less on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds, for example.

On occasion, a ridiculously-high purchase price for a given stock will cause a splendid business to become a poor investment – if not permanently, at least for a painfully long period. Over time, however, investment performance converges with business performance. And, as I will next spell out, the record of American business has been extraordinary.

The American Tailwind

On March 11 $^{th}$ , it will be 77 years since I first invested in an American business. The year was 1942, I was 11, and I went all in, investing \$114.75 I had begun accumulating at age six. What I bought was three shares of Cities Service preferred stock. I had become a capitalist, and it felt good.

Let's now travel back through the two 77-year periods that preceded my purchase. That leaves us starting in 1788, a year prior to George Washington's installation as our first president. Could anyone then have imagined what their new country would accomplish in only three 77-year lifetimes?

During the two 77-year periods prior to 1942, the United States had grown from four million people – about $\frac{1}{2}$ of $1\%$ of the world's population – into the most powerful country on earth. In that spring of 1942, though, it faced a crisis: The U.S. and its allies were suffering heavy losses in a war that we had entered only three months earlier. Bad news arrived daily.

Despite the alarming headlines, almost all Americans believed on that March 11 $^{th}$ that the war would be won. Nor was their optimism limited to that victory. Leaving aside congenital pessimists, Americans believed that their children and generations beyond would live far better lives than they themselves had led.

The nation's citizens understood, of course, that the road ahead would not be a smooth ride. It never had been. Early in its history our country was tested by a Civil War that killed $4\%$ of all American males and led President Lincoln to openly ponder whether "a nation so conceived and so dedicated could long endure." In the 1930s, America suffered through the Great Depression, a punishing period of massive unemployment.

Nevertheless, in 1942, when I made my purchase, the nation expected post-war growth, a belief that proved to be well-founded. In fact, the nation's achievements can best be described as breathtaking.

Let's put numbers to that claim: If my \$114.75 had been invested in a no-fee S&P 500 index fund, and all dividends had been reinvested, my stake would have grown to be worth (pre-taxes) \$606,811 on January 31, 2019 (the latest data available before the printing of this letter). That is a gain of 5,288 for 1. Meanwhile, a \$1 million investment by a tax-free institution of that time – say, a pension fund or college endowment – would have grown to about \$5.3 billion.

Let me add one additional calculation that I believe will shock you: If that hypothetical institution had paid only 1% of assets annually to various “helpers,” such as investment managers and consultants, its gain would have been cut in half, to \$2.65 billion. That’s what happens over 77 years when the 11.8% annual return actually achieved by the S&P 500 is recalculated at a 10.8% rate.

Those who regularly preach doom because of government budget deficits (as I regularly did myself for many years) might note that our country's national debt has increased roughly 400-fold during the last of my 77-year periods. That's 40,000%! Suppose you had foreseen this increase and panicked at the prospect of runaway deficits and a worthless currency. To “protect” yourself, you might have eschewed stocks and opted instead to buy 3 $\frac{1}{4}$ ounces of gold with your \$114.75.

And what would that supposed protection have delivered? You would now have an asset worth about \$4,200, less than 1% of what would have been realized from a simple unmanaged investment in American business. The magical metal was no match for the American mettle.

Our country's almost unbelievable prosperity has been gained in a bipartisan manner. Since 1942, we have had seven Republican presidents and seven Democrats. In the years they served, the country contended at various times with a long period of viral inflation, a $21\%$ prime rate, several controversial and costly wars, the resignation of a president, a pervasive collapse in home values, a paralyzing financial panic and a host of other problems. All engendered scary headlines; all are now history.

Christopher Wren, architect of St. Paul's Cathedral, lies buried within that London church. Near his tomb are posted these words of description (translated from Latin): “If you would seek my monument, look around you.” Those skeptical of America’s economic playbook should heed his message.

In 1788 – to go back to our starting point – there really wasn’t much here except for a small band of ambitious people and an embryonic governing framework aimed at turning their dreams into reality. Today, the Federal Reserve estimates our household wealth at \$108 trillion, an amount almost impossible to comprehend.

Remember, earlier in this letter, how I described retained earnings as having been the key to Berkshire's prosperity? So it has been with America. In the nation's accounting, the comparable item is labeled “savings.” And save we have. If our forefathers had instead consumed all they produced, there would have been no investment, no productivity gains and no leap in living standards.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie and I happily acknowledge that much of Berkshire's success has simply been a product of what I think should be called The American Tailwind. It is beyond arrogance for American businesses or individuals to boast that they have “done it alone.” The tidy rows of simple white crosses at Normandy should shame those who make such claims.

There are also many other countries around the world that have bright futures. About that, we should rejoice: Americans will be both more prosperous and safer if all nations thrive. At Berkshire, we hope to invest significant sums across borders.

Over the next 77 years, however, the major source of our gains will almost certainly be provided by The American Tailwind. We are lucky – gloriously lucky – to have that force at our back.

The Annual Meeting

Berkshire's 2019 annual meeting will take place on Saturday, May $4^{\text{th}}$ . If you are thinking about attending – and Charlie and I hope you come – check out the details on pages A-2 – A-3. They describe the same schedule we've followed for some years.

If you can't join us in Omaha, attend via Yahoo's webcast. Andy Serwer and his Yahoo associates do an outstanding job, both in covering the entire meeting and interviewing many Berkshire managers, celebrities, financial experts and shareholders from the U.S. and abroad. The world's knowledge of what goes on in Omaha the first Saturday of every May has grown dramatically since Yahoo came on board. Its coverage begins at 8:45 a.m. CDT and provides Mandarin translation.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

For 54 years, Charlie and I have loved our jobs. Daily, we do what we find interesting, working with people we like and trust. And now our new management structure has made our lives even more enjoyable.

With the whole ensemble – that is, with Ajit and Greg running operations, a great collection of businesses, a Niagara of cash-generation, a cadre of talented managers and a rock-solid culture – your company is in good shape for whatever the future brings.

February 23, 2019

Warren E. Buffett

Chairman of the Board

年份	年度百分比变化
	伯克希尔每股账面价值	伯克希尔每股市场价值	标普500（含股息）
1965	23.8	49.5	10.0
1966	20.3	(3.4)	(11.7)
1967	11.0	13.3	30.9
1968	19.0	77.8	11.0
1969	16.2	19.4	(8.4)
1970	12.0	(4.6)	3.9
1971	16.4	80.5	14.6
1972	21.7	8.1	18.9
1973	4.7	(2.5)	(14.8)
1974	5.5	(48.7)	(26.4)
1975	21.9	2.5	37.2
1976	59.3	129.3	23.6
1977	31.9	46.8	(7.4)
1978	24.0	14.5	6.4
1979	35.7	102.5	18.2
1980	19.3	32.8	32.3
1981	31.4	31.8	(5.0)
1982	40.0	38.4	21.4
1983	32.3	69.0	22.4
1984	13.6	(2.7)	6.1
1985	48.2	93.7	31.6
1986	26.1	14.2	18.6
1987	19.5	4.6	5.1
1988	20.1	59.3	16.6
1989	44.4	84.6	31.7
1990	7.4	(23.1)	(3.1)
1991	39.6	35.6	30.5
1992	20.3	29.8	7.6
1993	14.3	38.9	10.1
1994	13.9	25.0	1.3
1995	43.1	57.4	37.6
1996	31.8	6.2	23.0
1997	34.1	34.9	33.4
1998	48.3	52.2	28.6
1999	0.5	(19.9)	21.0
2000	6.5	26.6	(9.1)
2001	(6.2)	6.5	(11.9)
2002	10.0	(3.8)	(22.1)
2003	21.0	15.8	28.7
2004	10.5	4.3	10.9
2005	6.4	0.8	4.9
2006	18.4	24.1	15.8
2007	11.0	28.7	5.5
2008	(9.6)	(31.8)	(37.0)
2009	19.8	2.7	26.5
2010	13.0	21.4	15.1
2011	4.6	(4.7)	2.1
2012	14.4	16.8	16.0
2013	18.2	32.7	32.4
2014	8.3	27.0	13.7
2015	6.4	(12.5)	1.4
2016	10.7	23.4	12.0
2017	23.0	21.9	21.8
2018	0.4	2.8	(4.4)
1965-2018年复合年增长率	18.7%	20.5%	9.7%
1964-2018年总增长率	1,091,899%	2,472,627%	15,019%

注释：数据均为日历年度，但以下例外：1965年和1966年为截至9月30日止年份；1967年为截至12月31日止15个月。自1979年起，会计准则要求保险公司将其持有的权益证券按市值计价，而此前要求按成本与市价孰低法计价。在本表中，伯克希尔截至1978年的业绩已根据变更后的规则进行了重述。其他所有方面，业绩均按最初报告的数字计算。标普500指数数字为税前，而伯克希尔数字为税后。如果一家像伯克希尔这样的公司只是持有标普500指数并计提适当税款，那么在该指数显示正回报的年份其业绩会落后于标普500指数，但在该指数显示负回报的年份会超过标普500指数。多年累积下来，税务成本会导致其累计落后幅度相当大。

伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的股东：

2018年，伯克希尔根据美国通用会计准则（通常称为"GAAP"）盈利40亿美元。这一数字的构成包括：经营利润248亿美元，无形资产减值带来的30亿美元非现金损失（几乎全部来自我们在卡夫亨氏的股权），出售投资证券实现的28亿美元资本利得，以及因我们投资组合中未实现资本利得减少而产生的206亿美元损失。

一项新的美国通用会计准则要求我们将最后一项计入收益。正如我在2017年年报中强调的，伯克希尔的副董事长Charlie Munger和我都不认为这项规则是明智的。实际上，我们两人一直认为，在伯克希尔，这种按市值计价的变动将产生我所说的"我们净利润的剧烈且反复无常的波动"。

这一预测的准确性可以从我们2018年的季度业绩中看出。在第一季度和第四季度，我们报告的GAAP亏损分别为11亿美元和254亿美元。在第二季度和第三季度，我们报告的利润分别为120亿美元和185亿美元。与这些剧烈波动完全相反，伯克希尔拥有的众多企业在所有季度都实现了持续且令人满意的经营利润。全年来看，这些经营利润比它们2016年176亿美元的高点高出41%。

我们季度GAAP收益的大幅波动将不可避免地继续。这是因为我们庞大的股权投资组合——2018年底估值接近1730亿美元——经常会出现每日20亿美元或以上的价格波动，而新规则要求所有这些波动必须立即计入我们的净利润。事实上，在第四季度这个股价高度波动的时期，我们有好几天经历了超过40亿美元的"利润"或"亏损"。

我们的建议？关注经营利润，对各种收益或损失少加理会。我这样说绝没有贬低我们的投资对伯克希尔的重要性。随着时间的推移，Charlie和我期待它们带来丰厚的收益，尽管时间点高度不规律。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

我们的年度报告的长期读者会注意到我在这封信开头的不同方式。近三十年来，开头第一段都突出显示了伯克希尔每股账面价值的百分比变化。现在是时候放弃这种做法了。
事实上，伯克希尔账面价值年度变动——这个指标将在第2页做最后一次亮相——已经失去了它曾经具有的相关性。三个原因造成这一点。第一，伯克希尔已逐渐从一家资产集中于可交易股票的公司，转型为一家主要价值来自经营性企业的公司。查理和我预计这种转型将以不规则的方式继续。第二，尽管我们的股权投资按市价估值，但会计准则要求将我们的经营性企业集合以远低于其当前价值的金额计入账面价值，这种错估近年来还在加剧。第三，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔很可能将成为其股份的重要回购方，这些交易将以高于账面价值但低于我们估算的内在价值的价格进行。这种购买行为的数学逻辑很简单：每笔交易都会提高每股内在价值，同时降低每股账面价值。这种组合导致账面价值评分卡越来越脱离经济现实。

在未来的业绩报告里，我们预计将聚焦于伯克希尔的市价。市场可能极为反复无常：只要看看第2页列出的54年历史就知道了。然而，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔的股价将提供衡量企业表现的最佳标尺。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

在继续往下讲之前，我想告诉你一些好消息——真正的好消息——这些并未反映在我们的财务报表中。它涉及我们在2018年初做出的管理层调整，当时Ajit Jain被委任负责所有保险业务，Greg Abel被授权掌管所有其他运营。这些举措早就该做了。伯克希尔如今的管理状况远优于我独自监督运营之时。Ajit和Greg天赋异禀，而且伯克希尔的血液在他们血管中流淌。

现在，让我们来看看你所拥有的东西。

聚焦森林——忘记树木

评估伯克希尔的投资者有时会纠结于我们众多且多元化业务的细节——可以说是我们经济中的"树木"。鉴于我们拥有从细枝到红杉的庞大样本群，这种分析可能令人麻木。我们有些树已经病入膏肓，十年后很可能不复存在。但其他许多树注定会越长越大、越来越美。

幸运的是，要大致估算伯克希尔的内在商业价值，并不需要逐一评估每棵树。因为我们的森林包含五个重要的"林区"，每一个都可以在合理准确度内进行整体评估。其中四个林区是易于理解的差异化业务和金融资产集群。第五个——我们庞大且多元化的保险业务——以一种不那么明显的方式为伯克希尔带来巨大价值，我将在本信后面解释。

在我们更仔细地审视前四个林区之前，请允许我提醒你，我们在你资本配置中的首要目标：购买全部或部分由能干管理层经营、拥有有利且持久经济特征的企业。我们还需要以合理的价格进行这些购买。

有时，我们可以购买符合我们测试标准的企业的控股权。更常见的是，我们在公开交易的企业中找到了我们寻求的属性，通常会收购5%到10%的权益。我们在大规模资本配置上的双管齐下方法在美国企业中很少见，并且有时给我们带来重要的优势。
近些年，我们该走的路很清晰：许多股票提供的资金回报，远超我们整体收购一家企业所能获得的。这种差异让我们去年买入了约430亿美元的有价证券，而只卖出了190亿美元。查理和我相信，我们投资的公司提供了卓越的价值，远高于并购交易所能获得的。

尽管我们近期增持了有价证券，但伯克希尔森林中最有价值的果园，仍是我们控股的数十家非保险企业（通常100%持股，从不低于80%）。这些子公司去年赚了168亿美元。而且，我们说的"赚"，是指扣除了所有所得税、利息支出、管理层薪酬（无论是现金还是股票激励）、重组费用、折旧、摊销和总部管理费之后的数字。

这种盈利，与华尔街银行家和公司CEO们经常吹嘘的盈利概念相去甚远。他们宣讲时，常常大谈"调整后EBITDA"——这种指标重新定义了"盈利"，把各种真金白银的成本剔除在外。

例如，管理层有时声称，公司的股票激励不应该算作费用。（那还能算什么呢——股东送的礼物？）重组费用呢？好吧，也许去年那种具体的重组不会再发生。但商业中各种重组司空见惯——伯克希尔走过几十次这条路，我们的股东也一直承担着由此产生的成本。

亚伯拉罕·林肯曾问过："如果把狗尾巴叫腿，那狗有几条腿？"然后自答："四条，因为叫尾巴是腿并不会让它变成腿。"亚伯拉罕在华尔街会感到孤独的。

查理和我的确认为，我们与收购相关的摊销费用14亿美元（详见K-84页）并非真实的经济成本。在评估私有企业和有价股票时，我们会把这些摊销"成本"加回到美国通用会计准则（GAAP）的盈利中。

相反，伯克希尔84亿美元的折旧费用则低估了我们的真实经济成本。事实上，我们每年必须花超过这个数额的钱，才能在许多业务中保持竞争力。除了这些"维持性"资本支出，我们还投入巨额资金追求增长。总体而言，伯克希尔去年在厂房、设备和其他固定资产上投资了创纪录的145亿美元，其中89%投在美国。

伯克希尔价值第二大的果园是我们的股票投资组合，通常持有大型公司5%至10%的股权。如前所述，截至年末，我们的股权投资价值近1730亿美元，远高于其成本。如果按年末估值卖出这些组合，需缴纳约147亿美元的联邦所得税。很可能，我们会长期持有其中大部分股票。不过，最终卖出时，收益将按当时税率纳税。

我们的投资标的去年向我们支付了38亿美元股息，这个数字在2019年会增加。但比股息重要得多的是这些公司每年留存下来的巨额盈利。仅看我们五大重仓股的数据，就能窥见一斑。

公司	年末持股比例	伯克希尔应占份额（百万美元）
		股息(1)	留存收益(2)
American Express（美国运通）	17.9%	$ 237	$ 997
Apple（苹果）	5.4%	745	2,502
Bank of America（美国银行）	9.5%	551	2,096
Coca-Cola（可口可乐）	9.4%	624	(21)
Wells Fargo（富国银行）	9.8%	809	1,263
合计		$2,966	$6,837

(1) 基于当前年化股息率。
(2) 基于2018年盈利减去已支付的普通股和优先股股息。

美国通用会计准则——它决定了我们的报告盈利——不允许我们将被投资公司的留存收益计入财务报表。但这些留存收益对我们价值巨大：多年以来，被投资公司（作为一个整体）留存的收益，最终为伯克希尔带来的资本利得，总计超过了这些企业为我们再投资的每一美元。

我们所有的主要持股都拥有出色的经济特征，并且大部分公司会将部分留存收益用于回购自身股份。我们非常喜欢这一点：如果查理和我觉得某只被投资公司的股票被低估，我们会很高兴管理层动用部分收益来增加伯克希尔的持股比例。

下面举一个来自上表的例子：过去八年，伯克希尔持有American Express（美国运通）的股份数量保持不变。而与此同时，由于该公司回购股票，我们的持股比例从12.6%升至17.9%。去年，American Express（美国运通）盈利69亿美元，伯克希尔应占部分为12亿美元，约占我们为买入该股份所支付13亿美元的96%。当盈利增加而流通股减少时，所有者——长期来看——通常会有不错的回报。

伯克希尔的第三类业务所有权是四家我们与他人共同控制的公司。2018年，我们在这些业务中享有的税后营业利润份额——Kraft Heinz（卡夫亨氏）的26.7%、Berkadia（伯卡迪亚）和Electric Transmission Texas（得州输电公司）的50%、Pilot Flying J（飞箭）的38.6%——合计约为13亿美元。

在我们的第四块地里，伯克希尔年末持有1,120亿美元的美国国债及其他现金等价物，外加200亿美元的杂项固定收益工具。我们认为其中一部分现金是不可动用的，因为我们承诺始终持有至少200亿美元的现金等价物以防范外部灾难。我们还承诺避免任何可能威胁到维持这一缓冲的行为。

伯克希尔将永远是金融堡垒。在管理过程中，我会犯下代价高昂的委托错误，也会错过许多本应显而易见的机会。有时，随着投资者逃离股票，我们的股价也会暴跌。但我绝不会冒险让自己陷入现金短缺的境地。

未来几年，我们希望将大部分过剩流动性转移到伯克希尔将永久拥有的业务中。然而，近期的前景并不乐观：具有良好长期前景的企业价格高得离谱。

这一令人失望的现实意味着，2019年我们可能会再次扩大可交易股票的持仓。尽管如此，我们仍然希望进行一次大象级别的收购。即使在我们88岁和95岁的年龄——我是年轻的那个——这种可能性仍让查理和我的心跳加速。（光是写下大宗收购的可能性，就让我的脉搏飙升了。）

我对更多股票购买的预期并非市场预测。查理和我对下周或明年的股市表现一无所知。这种预测从来都不是我们活动的一部分。相反，我们的思考聚焦于计算一家有吸引力的企业的一部分股权是否比其市场价格更值钱。

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我相信，伯克希尔的内在价值可以通过将我们四个资产丰厚的果园的价值相加，再减去未来出售有价证券时最终应缴的相应税款来近似估算。

你可能会问，是否还应该为伯克希尔出售某些全资子公司时可能产生的重大税负成本计提准备金？忘了这个念头吧：即使出售这些优秀公司无需缴税，我们也不会傻到去卖掉它们。真正的好企业极难寻觅。卖掉任何你幸运拥有的好公司都是毫无道理的。

在我们计算伯克希尔非保险业务的利润时，所有债务的利息成本已经作为费用扣除。此外，我们对前四个果园的大部分所有权，是由伯克希尔第五个果园——一批卓越的保险公司——所产生的资金来融资的。我们称这些资金为"浮存金"，这是一种我们预期长期来看将是免费——甚至可能更好——的融资来源。我们将在本信后面部分解释浮存金的特性。

最后，一个关键且持久的重要点：通过将五个果园整合成一个单一实体，伯克希尔的价值得以最大化。这种安排使我们能够无缝且客观地配置大额资本、消除企业风险、避免封闭性、以极低成本为资产融资、偶尔利用税收效率，并最小化管理成本。

在伯克希尔，整体大于——远大于——各部分之和。

股份回购与报告

早些时候我提到，伯克希尔将不时回购自己的股票。假设我们以低于伯克希尔内在价值的价格买入（这当然是我们的意图），回购将同时惠及那些离开公司的股东和留下的股东。

确实，对于离开的股东来说，回购带来的好处非常微小。因为我们谨慎的回购操作将对伯克希尔的股价影响降至最低。尽管如此，卖家仍然能从市场上多一个买家那里获得一些好处。

对于继续持有的股东，好处显而易见：如果市场以90美分兑1美元的价格为离开合伙人的权益定价，那么每进行一次回购，继续持有的股东每股内在价值就会增加。显然，回购应该对价格敏感：盲目买入高估的股票是价值毁灭性的——许多喜欢宣传或永远乐观的CEO忽视了这一事实。

当一家公司表示考虑回购时，至关重要的是，所有股东合伙人都必须获得他们所需的信息，以便对价值做出明智的估算。查理和我在本报告中尽力提供这些信息。我们不希望任何合伙人因为被误导或信息不足而将股票卖回给公司。

然而，有些卖家可能不同意我们对价值的计算，另一些卖家则可能找到了他们认为比伯克希尔股票更具吸引力的投资。后一组中的一些人是对的：毫无疑问，许多股票将带来远高于我们的收益。

此外，某些股东会单纯地认为，是时候让他们或他们的家人成为净消费者，而不是继续积累资本了。查理和我在目前并不想加入那个群体。也许我们到了老年会变成大手大脚花钱的人。

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54年来，我们在伯克希尔的经营决策，都是从留下的股东的角度出发，而非离开的股东。因此，查理和我从未关注过当季的业绩。
伯克希尔实际上可能是《财富》500强中唯一一家不编制月度收益报告或资产负债表的公司。当然，我本人会定期查看大多数子公司的月度财务报告。但查理和我每季度才了解伯克希尔的整体盈利和财务状况。

此外，伯克希尔没有全公司的预算（尽管许多子公司认为预算很有用）。缺乏这种工具意味着母公司从未有过需要达成的季度“数字”。不使用这种目标，向我们的众多经理人传递了一个重要信息，强化了我们珍视的文化。

多年来，查理和我见过各种不良的公司行为——无论是会计层面还是运营层面——都是由管理层满足华尔街期望的欲望引发的。开始时是“无伤大雅”的小花招，只是为了不让“华尔街”失望——比如季度末压货、对不断增加的保险损失视而不见、或者动用“饼干罐”储备——但这可能演变成彻头彻尾的欺诈。“就这一次”在数字上做手脚可能是CEO的本意，但很少会止步于此。如果老板可以稍微作弊，下属也很容易将类似行为合理化。

在伯克希尔，我们的听众既不是分析师也不是评论员：查理和我是在为我们的股东合伙人工作。流向我们这里的数字，就是我们将传递给你们的数字。

非保险业务——从棒棒糖到机车

现在我们进一步看看伯克希尔最珍贵的果园——我们的非保险业务组合——请记住，我们不想不必要地向竞争对手提供可能对他们有用的信息。关于各业务运营的更多细节，请参见K-5至K-22页和K-40至K-51页。

从整体来看，这些业务在2018年实现了208亿美元的税前利润，比2017年增长了24%。2018年进行的收购仅贡献了其中微不足道的一部分。

我在讨论中将继续使用税前数字。但2018年这些业务给我们带来的税后收益增长要大得多——47%——这在很大程度上要归功于当年年初生效的企业税率下调。让我们来看看为什么影响如此巨大。

从一个经济现实开始：无论喜欢与否，美国政府在伯克希尔的盈利中“拥有”一部分权益，其规模由国会决定。实际上，我们的财政部持有伯克希尔的一种特殊股票——称这种股票为AA股——它从伯克希尔获得巨额“股息”（即税款）。2017年以及之前的许多年，企业税率为35%，这意味着财政部从它的AA股中获得了非常丰厚的回报。事实上，我们在1965年接手时一文不值的政府“股票”，已演变为每年向联邦政府贡献数十亿美元的持股。

然而去年，当企业税率降至21%时，政府“所有权”的40%（14/35）被无偿返还给了伯克希尔。因此，我们的“A”股和“B”股股东所享有的每股收益获得了重大提升。

这一事件实质性增加了你和我所持有的伯克希尔股票的内在价值。而且，同样的动态也增强了伯克希尔持有的几乎所有股票的内在价值。
以下是翻译后的中文译文：

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这些是头条新闻。但也有其他因素需要考虑，它们削弱了我们的收益。例如，我们大型公用事业运营所获得的税收优惠会传递给其客户。与此同时，我们收到的国内公司大额股息所适用的税率变化不大，约为13%。（这一较低税率长期以来是合理的，因为被投资公司支付给我们的收益已缴纳过税款。）不过总体而言，新税法让我们的企业和持有的股票价值大幅提升。

这引出了我们的非保险业务表现。我们这片林中的两棵参天红杉是BNSF（伯灵顿北方圣塔菲铁路公司）和伯克希尔·哈撒韦能源公司（持股90.9%）。去年，两者合计税前利润为93亿美元，较2017年增长6%。您可以在第K-5至K-10页和第K-40至K-45页了解这些业务的更多信息。

接下来，按利润排序（此处按字母顺序列出）的五家非保险子公司——Clayton Homes（克莱顿房屋）、International Metalworking（国际金属加工）、Lubrizol（路博润）、Marmon（马蒙）和Precision Castparts（精密铸件）——2018年合计税前利润为64亿美元，高于2017年的55亿美元。

再往下，同样排序和列出的五家（Forest River（森林河）、Johns Manville（约翰斯·曼维尔）、MiTek（迈泰克）、Shaw（萧氏）和TTI）去年税前利润为24亿美元，高于2017年的21亿美元。

伯克希尔拥有的其余非保险业务——而且数量众多——2018年税前利润为36亿美元，而2017年为33亿美元。

保险、“浮存金”及伯克希尔的资金来源

我们的财产/意外险（“P/C”）业务——我们的第五片林——自1967年以来一直是推动伯克希尔增长的引擎。那一年，我们以860万美元收购了National Indemnity（国民 indemnity）及其姊妹公司National Fire & Marine（国民火险与海事）。如今，按净资产衡量，National Indemnity是全球最大的财产/意外险公司。

我们被P/C业务吸引的一个原因是该行业的商业模式：P/C保险公司先收保费，后理赔。在极端情况下，例如石棉暴露或严重工伤事故引发的理赔，付款可能跨越数十年。

这种先收后付的模式让P/C公司持有大笔资金——我们称之为“浮存金”——这些钱最终将流向他人。与此同时，保险公司可以用这笔浮存金为自己投资。尽管个别保单和理赔不断更替，但保险公司持有的浮存金金额通常与保费规模保持相对稳定。因此，随着业务增长，我们的浮存金也在增长。而且，它增长得有多快，如下表所示：

年份	浮存金（百万美元）*
1970	$ 39
1980	237
1990	1,632
2000	27,871
2010	65,832
2018	122,732

• 包括来自寿险、年金和健康保险业务的浮存金。

我们未来可能会经历浮存金下降。如果是这样，下降将非常缓慢——任何一年最多不超过3%。我们保险合同的性质决定了我们永远不会面临对我们现金资源有重大意义的即时或短期巨额资金需求。这种结构是设计使然，也是我们保险公司无与伦比的财务实力的关键组成部分。这种实力绝不会受到损害。

如果我们的保费超过费用和最终损失的总和，我们的保险运营就会产生承销利润，从而增加浮存金带来的投资收益。当获得这样的利润时，我们便享受了免费资金的使用权——而且，更好的是，持有这些钱还能获得报酬。
遗憾的是，所有保险公司希望实现这一美好愿望的强烈意愿，也催生了激烈的竞争，其激烈程度甚至有时会导致整个财产/意外险行业出现重大的承保亏损。从本质上讲，这种亏损就是该行业为持有其浮存金所付出的代价。竞争动态几乎注定了，尽管行业内所有公司都能享受浮存金收入，但与美国其他企业相比，保险业在有形净资产上的回报率仍然会持续其惨淡的记录。

尽管如此，我仍然看好我们自己的前景。伯克希尔无与伦比的财务实力，让我们在运用浮存金进行投资时，拥有比一般财产/意外险公司大得多的灵活性。我们拥有的众多选择始终是一项优势，并且偶尔会带来重大机遇。当其他保险公司捉襟见肘时，我们的选择空间反而扩大了。

此外，我们的财产/意外险公司拥有卓越的承保记录。在过去16年中，伯克希尔有15年实现了承保盈利，唯一的例外是2017年，当年我们的税前亏损为32亿美元。在这整整16年的时间里，我们的税前盈利总计达到了270亿美元，其中2018年入账了20亿美元。

这一记录绝非偶然：严格的承保风险评估是我们保险经理人日常关注的焦点，他们深知，糟糕的承保结果可能会淹没浮存金带来的好处。所有保险公司对此都只是嘴上说得好听。但在伯克希尔，这是一条信仰，旧约圣经式的信仰。

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在大多数情况下，企业的资金来源有两个——债务和股权。在伯克希尔，我们的箭袋里还有两支额外的箭可供讨论，但让我们先谈谈传统的组成部分。

我们很少使用债务。应当指出，许多管理者会不同意这一政策，他们认为可观的债务能提升股权所有者的回报。在大多数情况下，这些更具冒险精神的CEO们是对的。

然而，在罕见且不可预测的时刻，信用会消失，债务会变成财务上的致命伤。一种俄罗斯轮盘赌的方程式——通常是赢，偶尔会死——对于那些能分享公司上涨收益，却不必承担下跌风险的人来说，在财务上或许是合理的。但这样的策略对伯克希尔而言将是疯狂之举。理性的人不会拿他们拥有且需要的东西，去冒险博取他们不曾拥有且不需要的东西。

你在我们的合并资产负债表（见K-65页）上看到的大部分债务，都来自我们的铁路和能源子公司，这两家都是重资产公司。在经济衰退期间，这些业务的现金生成能力依然充沛。它们使用的债务既与其业务运营相匹配，也不由伯克希尔提供担保。

我们的股权资本水平则是另一回事：伯克希尔的3490亿美元在美国企业界是无可匹敌的。通过长期保留所有盈利，并让复利发挥其魔力，我们已经积累了巨额资金，使我们能够购买和开发前面描述的那些宝贵的果园。如果我们当初遵循了100%的分红政策，那么我们现在可能仍然在依赖1965财年起步时的2200万美元运营。

除了使用债务和股权之外，伯克希尔还从两个不那么常见的公司资金来源中受益匪浅。较大的一项是我之前描述的浮存金。到目前为止，尽管这些资金在我们的资产负债表上被记为一项巨大的净负债，但它们对我们的用途甚至超过了等额的股权资本。这是因为它们通常伴随着承保盈利。实际上，在大多数年份里，我们因为持有和使用他人的资金而获得了报酬。
正如我此前多次强调，这份喜悦绝非板上钉钉：评估保险风险时可能犯下巨大错误，且这些错误往往要多年后才浮出水面（想想石棉）。一场将令卡特里娜飓风和迈克尔飓风相形见绌的大灾必会发生——也许明天，也许几十年后。这场"大浩劫"可能源自传统源头，比如飓风或地震，也可能完全出人意料，例如一场网络攻击，其灾难性后果远超保险公司眼下所能设想的任何情景。当这样一场超级巨灾降临时，我们将承担自己那份损失，而且数额会很大——非常大。不过，与许多其他保险公司不同，我们会第二天就着手拓展业务。

最后一个资金来源——伯克希尔同样在这方面拥有罕见的优势——是递延所得税。这些负债我们最终还是要缴的，但在此之前它们都是无息负债。

如我之前所述，我们505亿美元递延所得税中，约有147亿美元来自股权持仓的未实现收益。这些负债按现行21%的企业税率在我们的财务报表中计提，但实际缴纳时将按出售投资时的税率支付。从现在到那时，我们实际上拥有一笔无息"贷款"，让我们能在股权领域投入比原本更多的资金。

另有283亿美元的递延所得税，源于我们在计算当期应缴税款时，得以加速折旧厂房设备等资产。我们记录的前期节税效应会在未来逐年反转。不过，我们持续购入新资产。只要现行税法不变，这一资金来源应会持续增长。

长期来看，伯克希尔的资金基础——也就是我们资产负债表的右半边——应当会主要通过我们留存的收益而增长。我们的任务是将留存的资金在资产负债表的左半边派上好用场——也就是增加有吸引力的资产。

GEICO与Tony Nicely

这个标题已经说明一切：这家公司与这位先生密不可分。

Tony于1961年加入GEICO，当时年仅18岁；我在1970年代中期认识了他。那时，GEICO在经历了长达四十年的快速增长和卓越承保业绩后，突然发现自己濒临破产。新上任的管理层严重低估了GEICO的损失成本，从而给产品定价过低。要等那些在GEICO账簿上产生亏损的保单——至少230万份——过期并重新定价，需要好几个月。与此同时，公司的净资产正迅速趋近于零。

1976年，Jack Byrne被请来担任CEO拯救GEICO。他上任后不久，我见到了他，认定他是这项工作最合适的人选，于是开始大举买入GEICO股票。几个月内，伯克希尔买下了该公司约三分之一股份，后来这一比例在不花我们一分钱的情况下增至约二分之一。这惊人的增厚源于GEICO在恢复健康后持续回购其股票。总的来说，这半壁江山花了伯克希尔4700万美元，差不多相当于你今天在纽约买一套顶级公寓的钱。

现在快进17年到1993年，Tony Nicely被晋升为CEO。那时，GEICO的声誉和盈利能力已经恢复——但增长尚未恢复。事实上，1992年底，该公司账簿上只有190万份汽车保单，远低于危机前的高点。在美国汽车保险商中，按销量排名，GEICO当时不过是第七名，一点都不突出。
1995年底，托尼让GEICO重焕活力后，伯克希尔出价23亿美元收购了该公司剩余的50%股权，这个价格是我们之前购买前半部分时的约50倍（有人说我从不加价！）。这次收购成功了，为我们带来了一家出色但尚待开发的公司，以及一位同样出色的首席执行官，他把GEICO带到了我做梦都想不到的高度。

如今，GEICO是美国第二大汽车保险公司，销售额比1995年增长了1200%。自我们收购以来，承销利润（税前）总计155亿美元，可用于投资的浮存金从25亿美元增长到221亿美元。

据我估算，托尼对GEICO的管理使伯克希尔的内在价值增加了500多亿美元。除此之外，他作为管理者堪称典范，帮助他的4万名员工发现并打磨了自己都未曾意识到的才能。

去年，托尼决定辞去首席执行官职务，并于6月30日将该职位交给了他的长期合作伙伴比尔·罗伯茨。我认识并观察比尔几十年了，托尼再一次做出了正确的选择。托尼将继续担任董事长，并在有生之年为GEICO提供帮助。他绝不会有所保留。

所有伯克希尔股东都应感谢托尼。我排在首位。

投资

以下列出我们截至年底市值最大的十五只普通股投资。我们排除了所持的卡夫亨氏股份（325,442,152股），因为伯克希尔属于控制集团，因此必须按“权益”法核算该投资。在资产负债表上，伯克希尔按GAAP计价持有卡夫亨氏投资138亿美元，该金额已扣除了我们承担卡夫亨氏2018年大额无形资产减值中的份额。年底时，我们持有的卡夫亨氏市值为140亿美元，成本基础为98亿美元。

持股数*	公司	持股比例	12/31/18 成本**	12/31/18 市值
			（单位：百万美元）
151,610,700	美国运通公司	17.9%	1,287	14,452
255,300,329	苹果公司	5.4%	36,044	40,271
918,919,000	美国银行	9.5%	11,650	22,642
84,488,751	纽约梅隆银行	8.8%	3,860	3,977
6,789,054	特许通讯公司	3.0%	1,210	1,935
400,000,000	可口可乐公司	9.4%	1,299	18,940
65,535,000	达美航空	9.6%	2,860	3,270
18,784,698	高盛集团	4.9%	2,380	3,138
50,661,394	摩根大通	1.5%	5,605	4,946
24,669,778	穆迪公司	12.9%	248	3,455
47,890,899	西南航空	8.7%	2,005	2,226
21,938,642	联合大陆控股公司	8.1%	1,195	1,837
146,346,999	美国合众银行	9.1%	5,548	6,688
43,387,980	USG公司	31.0%	836	1,851
449,349,102	富国银行	9.8%	10,639	20,706
	其他		16,201	22,423
	按市值计价的普通股合计		102,867	172,757
* 不包括伯克希尔子公司养老基金持有的股份。
** 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的计税基础。

查理和我并不将上述1,728亿美元视为一系列股票代码——一种因“华尔街”下调评级、预期的美联储行动、可能的政治局势、经济学家的预测或任何其他当下热门话题而终止的金融调情。实际上，我们在持仓中看到的是一个我们部分拥有的公司集合，这些公司在加权基础上，其经营所需的有形净资产收益率约为20%。此外，这些公司无需过度举债就能赚取利润。

这样的回报率，由大型、成熟且易于理解的企业实现，在任何情况下都是非凡的。与许多投资者在过去十年中从债券上接受的回报相比——例如30年期美国国债的3%或更低——简直令人难以置信。

有时，对某只股票支付高得离谱的价格，会让一家优秀的企业变成糟糕的投资——即使不是永久性的，至少也会痛苦很长一段时间。但随着时间的推移，投资绩效会与企业绩效趋于一致。而我接下来将阐述，美国企业的业绩记录一直是非凡的。

美国顺风

到3月11日，距离我第一次投资一家美国企业将满77年。那是1942年，我11岁，倾尽所有投资了114.75美元——我从6岁开始积攒的。我买了三股Cities Service（城市服务公司）优先股。我成了一名资本家，感觉真好。

现在让我们回溯到我买入之前的那两个77年时期。这样我们就从1788年开始，那是在乔治·华盛顿就任我国第一任总统的前一年。当时有谁能想象这个新国家在仅仅三个77年的人生历程中会取得何等成就？

在1942年之前的两个77年时期里，美国从400万人口——约占世界人口的0.5%——成长为地球上最强大的国家。但在1942年春天，它面临一场危机：美国及其盟友在一场我们仅三个月前才参战的战争中遭受重大损失。坏消息每天传来。

尽管新闻标题令人震惊，但几乎所有的美国人在那个3月11日都相信战争会胜利。他们的乐观也不仅限于这场胜利。抛开天生的悲观主义者不谈，美国人民相信他们的孩子和后代将过上远比他们自己更好的生活。

这个国家的公民当然明白，前方的道路不会一帆风顺。从来都没有过。在建国初期，我国经历了一场内战的考验，这场战争夺去了4%美国男性的生命，并导致林肯总统公开思考“一个如此孕育和如此奉献的国家能否长久存续”。在1930年代，美国经历了大萧条，那是大规模失业的艰难时期。

尽管如此，在1942年我买入时，这个国家预期战后增长，这一信念被证明是很有根据的。事实上，这个国家的成就只能用“叹为观止”来形容。

让我们用数据来证明这一说法：如果我的114.75美元投资于一只免手续费的标普500指数基金，并且所有股息都进行再投资，那么我的份额到2019年1月31日（本信付印前可获取的最新数据）将增长为（税前）606,811美元。这是5,288比1的收益。与此同时，当时一家免税机构——比如养老基金或大学捐赠基金——投资的100万美元，将增至约53亿美元。
让我再补充一个计算，我相信会让你大吃一惊：如果那家假设的机构每年仅将资产的1%支付给各类"帮手"——比如投资经理和顾问——那么它的收益将会被腰斩，降至26.5亿美元。这就是标普500年均11.8%的实际回报率按10.8%重新计算后，在77年里会发生的事情。

那些总因为政府预算赤字成天唱衰的人（我自己多年来也常干这事儿）不妨留意一下：在我这77年人生的最后阶段，我们国家的国债大约增长了400倍。那可是40,000%！假设你预见到了这种增长，被失控的赤字和一文不值的货币前景吓得惊慌失措。为了"保护"自己，你可能避开了股票，转而用你那114.75美元买了3.25盎司黄金。

那种所谓的保护又能带来什么结果呢？你的资产现在价值约4,200美元，还不到对美国企业进行一项简单、无需管理的投资所获回报的1%。这块魔法金属，终究敌不过美国的骨气。

我们国家近乎不可思议的繁荣，是在两党的共同努力下取得的。自1942年以来，我们有七位共和党总统和七位民主党总统。在他们任职的岁月里，这个国家先后经历了长期的恶性通胀、21%的基准利率、几场争议重重且代价高昂的战争、一位总统的辞职、房价的全面崩盘、一场瘫痪性的金融恐慌以及其他诸多问题。所有这些都是当年的耸人听闻的头条；而如今，都已成历史。

圣保罗大教堂的建筑师克里斯托弗·雷恩，就安葬在那座伦敦教堂之内。他的墓碑旁刻着这样的描述（由拉丁文译出）："你若寻我的纪念碑，请环顾四周。"那些对美国经济路线图心存怀疑的人，应当听听他的话。

在1788年——让我们回到起点——这里除了少数野心勃勃的人和一套旨在将梦想变为现实的雏形治理框架外，几乎一无所有。如今，根据美联储的估算，我国家庭财富高达108万亿美元，这个数字几乎难以想象。

还记得吗，在这封信的前面，我是如何将留存收益描述为伯克希尔繁荣的关键？对美国而言，道理亦然。在国家账目中，与之对应的科目被称为"储蓄"。我们确实在储蓄。倘若我们的祖先将生产的一切全部消耗殆尽，那就不会有投资，不会有生产率提升，也不会有生活水平的飞跃。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

查理和我乐于承认，伯克希尔的成功很大一部分不过是我认为应当称之为"美国顺风"的产物。美国的商业或个人吹嘘他们是"单打独斗"的成功，这简直是狂妄至极。诺曼底那一排排朴素的白色十字架，应当让那些说出这种话的人感到羞愧。

世界上还有许多其他国家也拥有光明的未来。对此，我们应该感到高兴：如果所有国家都繁荣昌盛，美国人将既更富足也更安全。在伯克希尔，我们希望进行大规模的跨国投资。

然而，在未来的77年里，我们收益的主要来源几乎可以肯定仍将是"美国顺风"。我们有幸——无比有幸——能有这股力量在背后推着我们。

年度股东大会

伯克希尔2019年年度股东大会将于5月4日（星期六）举行。如果你正考虑参加——查理和我都希望你能来——请查阅A-2至A-3页的具体安排。它们描述的是我们已经沿用多年的同一个日程。
如果你无法亲临奥马哈，可以通过雅虎的网络直播参加。Andy Serwer 和他的雅虎团队做得非常出色，全程报道会议，并采访众多伯克希尔（Berkshire）的管理层、名人、金融专家以及来自美国和海外的股东。自雅虎加入以来，世界对每年五月第一个星期六在奥马哈发生的事情有了更多了解。他们的报道于美国中部夏令时间上午 8:45 开始，并提供中文翻译。

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54 年来，Charlie 和我热爱我们的工作。每天，我们做自己觉得有趣的事，与喜欢和信任的人共事。如今，新的管理架构让我们的生活更加愉快。

整个团队——即 Ajit 和 Greg 负责运营、拥有一系列优秀的企业、如同尼亚加拉瀑布般的现金生成能力、一批才华横溢的管理者以及坚如磐石的文化——无论未来如何，你的公司都处于良好状态。

2019年2月23日

Warren E. Buffett

董事会主席