Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Annual Percentage Change | ||
| in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | |
| Year | ||
| 1965 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| 2018 | 2.8 | (4.4) |
| 2019 | 11.0 | 31.5 |
| 2020 | 2.4 | 18.4 |
| 2021 | 29.6 | 28.7 |
| Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-2021 | 20.1% | 10.5% |
| Overall Gain – 1964-2021 | 3,641,613% | 30,209% |
Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing a portion of your savings. We are honored by your trust.
Our position carries with it the responsibility to report to you what we would like to know if we were the absentee owner and you were the manager. We enjoy communicating directly with you through this annual letter, and through the annual meeting as well.
Our policy is to treat all shareholders equally. Therefore, we do not hold discussions with analysts nor large institutions. Whenever possible, also, we release important communications on Saturday mornings in order to maximize the time for shareholders and the media to absorb the news before markets open on Monday.
A wealth of Berkshire facts and figures are set forth in the annual 10-K that the company regularly files with the S.E.C. and that we reproduce on pages K-1 – K-119. Some shareholders will find this detail engrossing; others will simply prefer to learn what Charlie and I believe is new or interesting at Berkshire.
Alas, there was little action of that sort in 2021. We did, though, make reasonable progress in increasing the intrinsic value of your shares. That task has been my primary duty for 57 years. And it will continue to be.
What You Own
Berkshire owns a wide variety of businesses, some in their entirety, some only in part. The second group largely consists of marketable common stocks of major American companies. Additionally, we own a few non-U.S. equities and participate in several joint ventures or other collaborative activities.
Whatever our form of ownership, our goal is to have meaningful investments in businesses with both durable economic advantages and a first-class CEO. Please note particularly that we own stocks based upon our expectations about their long-term business performance and not because we view them as vehicles for timely market moves. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.
I make many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses includes some enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many others that enjoy good economic characteristics, and a few that are marginal. One advantage of our common-stock segment is that – on occasion – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. That shooting-fish-in-a-barrel experience is very rare in negotiated transactions and never occurs en masse. It is also far easier to exit from a mistake when it has been made in the marketable arena.
Surprise, Surprise
Here are a few items about your company that often surprise even seasoned investors:
- Many people perceive Berkshire as a large and somewhat strange collection of financial assets. In truth, Berkshire owns and operates more U.S.-based “infrastructure” assets – classified on our balance sheet as property, plant and equipment – than are owned and operated by any other American corporation. That supremacy has never been our goal. It has, however, become a fact.
At yearend, those domestic infrastructure assets were carried on Berkshire's balance sheet at \$158 billion. That number increased last year and will continue to increase. Berkshire always will be building.
- Every year, your company makes substantial federal income tax payments. In 2021, for example, we paid \$3.3 billion while the U.S. Treasury reported total corporate income-tax receipts of \$402 billion. Additionally, Berkshire pays substantial state and foreign taxes. “I gave at the office” is an unassailable assertion when made by Berkshire shareholders.
Berkshire's history vividly illustrates the invisible and often unrecognized financial partnership between government and American businesses. Our tale begins early in 1955, when Berkshire Fine Spinning and Hathaway Manufacturing agreed to merge their businesses. In their requests for shareholder approval, these venerable New England textile companies expressed high hopes for the combination.
The Hathaway solicitation, for example, assured its shareholders that “The combination of the resources and managements will result in one of the strongest and most efficient organizations in the textile industry.” That upbeat view was endorsed by the company’s advisor, Lehman Brothers (yes, that Lehman Brothers).
I'm sure it was a joyous day in both Fall River (Berkshire) and New Bedford (Hathaway) when the union was consummated. After the bands stopped playing and the bankers went home, however, the shareholders reaped a disaster.
In the nine years following the merger, Berkshire's owners watched the company's net worth crater from \$51.4 million to \$22.1 million. In part, this decline was caused by stock repurchases, ill-advised dividends and plant shutdowns. But nine years of effort by many thousands of employees delivered an operating loss as well. Berkshire's struggles were not unusual: The New England textile industry had silently entered an extended and non-reversible death march.
During the nine post-merger years, the U.S. Treasury suffered as well from Berkshire's troubles. All told, the company paid the government only \$337,359 in income tax during that period – a pathetic \$100 per day.
Early in 1965, things changed. Berkshire installed new management that redeployed available cash and steered essentially all earnings into a variety of good businesses, most of which remained good through the years. Coupling reinvestment of earnings with the power of compounding worked its magic, and shareholders prospered.
Berkshire’s owners, it should be noted, were not the only beneficiary of that course correction. Their “silent partner,” the U.S. Treasury, proceeded to collect many tens of billions of dollars from the company in income tax payments. Remember the \$100 daily? Now, Berkshire pays roughly \$9 million daily to the Treasury.
In fairness to our governmental partner, our shareholders should acknowledge – indeed trumpet – the fact that Berkshire’s prosperity has been fostered mightily because the company has operated in America. Our country would have done splendidly in the years since 1965 without Berkshire. Absent our American home, however, Berkshire would never have come close to becoming what it is today. When you see the flag, say thanks.
- From an \$8.6 million purchase of National Indemnity in 1967, Berkshire has become the world leader in insurance “float” – money we hold and can invest but that does not belong to us. Including a relatively small sum derived from life insurance, Berkshire’s total float has grown from \$19 million when we entered the insurance business to \$147 billion.
So far, this float has cost us less than nothing. Though we have experienced a number of years when insurance losses combined with operating expenses exceeded premiums, overall we have earned a modest 55-year profit from the underwriting activities that generated our float.
Of equal importance, float is very sticky. Funds attributable to our insurance operations come and go daily, but their aggregate total is immune from precipitous decline. When it comes to investing float, we can therefore think long-term.
If you are not already familiar with the concept of float, I refer you to a long explanation on page A-5. To my surprise, our float increased \$9 billion last year, a buildup of value that is important to Berkshire owners though is not reflected in our GAAP (“generally-accepted accounting principles”) presentation of earnings and net worth.
Much of our huge value creation in insurance is attributable to Berkshire's good luck in my 1986 hiring of Ajit Jain. We first met on a Saturday morning, and I quickly asked Ajit what his insurance experience had been. He replied, "None."
I said, “Nobody’s perfect,” and hired him. That was my lucky day: Ajit actually was as perfect a choice as could have been made. Better yet, he continues to be – 35 years later.
One final thought about insurance: I believe that it is likely – but far from assured – that Berkshire’s float can be maintained without our incurring a long-term underwriting loss. I am certain, however, that there will be some years when we experience such losses, perhaps involving very large sums.
Berkshire is constructed to handle catastrophic events as no other insurer – and that priority will remain long after Charlie and I are gone.
Our Four Giants
Through Berkshire, our shareholders own many dozens of businesses. Some of these, in turn, have a collection of subsidiaries of their own. For example, Marmon has more than 100 individual business operations, ranging from the leasing of railroad cars to the manufacture of medical devices.
- Nevertheless, operations of our “Big Four” companies account for a very large chunk of Berkshire’s value. Leading this list is our cluster of insurers. Berkshire effectively owns 100% of this group, whose massive float value we earlier described. The invested assets of these insurers are further enlarged by the extraordinary amount of capital we invest to back up their promises.
The insurance business is made to order for Berkshire. The product will never be obsolete, and sales volume will generally increase along with both economic growth and inflation. Also, integrity and capital will forever be important. Our company can and will behave well.
There are, of course, other insurers with excellent business models and prospects. Replication of Berkshire's operation, however, would be almost impossible.
- Apple – our runner-up Giant as measured by its yearend market value – is a different sort of holding. Here, our ownership is a mere 5.55%, up from 5.39% a year earlier. That increase sounds like small potatoes. But consider that each 0.1% of Apple’s 2021 earnings amounted to \$100 million. We spent no Berkshire funds to gain our accretion. Apple’s repurchases did the job.
It’s important to understand that only dividends from Apple are counted in the GAAP earnings Berkshire reports – and last year, Apple paid us \$785 million of those. Yet our “share” of Apple’s earnings amounted to a staggering \$5.6 billion. Much of what the company retained was used to repurchase Apple shares, an act we applaud. Tim Cook, Apple’s brilliant CEO, quite properly regards users of Apple products as his first love, but all of his other constituencies benefit from Tim’s managerial touch as well.
- BNSF, our third Giant, continues to be the number one artery of American commerce, which makes it an indispensable asset for America as well as for Berkshire. If the many essential products BNSF carries were instead hauled by truck, America's carbon emissions would soar.
Your railroad had record earnings of \$6 billion in 2021. Here, it should be noted, we are talking about the old-fashioned sort of earnings that we favor: a figure calculated after interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization and all forms of compensation. (Our definition suggests a warning: Deceptive “adjustments” to earnings – to use a polite description – have become both more frequent and more fanciful as stocks have risen. Speaking less politely, I would say that bull markets breed bloviated bull . . .)
BNSF trains traveled 143 million miles last year and carried 535 million tons of cargo. Both accomplishments far exceed those of any other American carrier. You can be proud of your railroad.
- BHE, our final Giant, earned a record \$4 billion in 2021. That's up more than 30-fold from the \$122 million earned in 2000, the year that Berkshire first purchased a BHE stake. Now, Berkshire owns 91.1% of the company.
BHE's record of societal accomplishment is as remarkable as its financial performance. The company had no wind or solar generation in 2000. It was then regarded simply as a relatively new and minor participant in the huge electric utility industry. Subsequently, under David Sokol's and Greg Abel's leadership, BHE has become a utility powerhouse (no groaning, please) and a leading force in wind, solar and transmission throughout much of the United States.
Greg's report on these accomplishments appears on pages A-3 and A-4. The profile you will find there is not in any way one of those currently-fashionable “green-washing” stories. BHE has been faithfully detailing its plans and performance in renewables and transmissions every year since 2007.
To further review this information, visit BHE's website at brkenergy.com. There, you will see that the company has long been making climate-conscious moves that soak up all of its earnings. More opportunities lie ahead. BHE has the management, the experience, the capital and the appetite for the huge power projects that our country needs.
Investments
Now let's talk about companies we don't control, a list that again references Apple. Below we list our fifteen largest equity holdings, several of which are selections of Berkshire's two long-time investment managers, Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. At yearend, this valued pair had total authority in respect to \$34 billion of investments, many of which do not meet the threshold value we use in the table. Also, a significant portion of the dollars that Todd and Ted manage are lodged in various pension plans of Berkshire-owned businesses, with the assets of these plans not included in this table.
| Percentage of Company Owned | 12/31/21 | |||
| Shares | Company | Cost* | Market | |
| (in millions) | ||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 19.9 | 1,287 | 24,804 |
| 907,559,761 | Apple Inc. | 5.6 | 31,089 | 161,155 |
| 1,032,852,006 | Bank of America Corp. | 12.8 | 14,631 | 45,952 |
| 66,835,615 | The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. | 8.3 | 2,918 | 3,882 |
| 225,000,000 | BYD Co. Ltd.** | 7.7 | 232 | 7,693 |
| 3,828,941 | Charter Communications, Inc. | 2.2 | 643 | 2,496 |
| 38,245,036 | Chevron Corporation | 2.0 | 3,420 | 4,488 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.2 | 1,299 | 23,684 |
| 52,975,000 | General Motors Company | 3.6 | 1,616 | 3,106 |
| 89,241,000 | ITOCHU Corporation | 5.6 | 2,099 | 2,728 |
| 81,714,800 | Mitsubishi Corporation | 5.5 | 2,102 | 2,593 |
| 93,776,200 | Mitsui & Co., Ltd. | 5.7 | 1,621 | 2,219 |
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation | 13.3 | 248 | 9,636 |
| 143,456,055 | U.S. Bancorp | 9.7 | 5,384 | 8,058 |
| 158,824,575 | Verizon Communications Inc. | 3.8 | 9,387 | 8,253 |
| Others*** | 26,629 | 39,972 | ||
| Total Equity Investments Carried at Market | $ 104,605 | $ 350,719 | ||
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis.
** Held by BHE; consequently, Berkshire shareholders have only a 91.1% interest in this position.
*** Includes a \$10 billion investment in Occidental Petroleum, consisting of preferred stock and warrants to buy common stock, a combination now being valued at \$10.7 billion.
In addition to the footnoted Occidental holding and our various common-stock positions, Berkshire also owns a 26.6% interest in Kraft Heinz (accounted for on the “equity” method, not market value, and carried at \$13.1 billion) and 38.6% of Pilot Corp., a leader in travel centers that had revenues last year of \$45 billion.
Since we purchased our Pilot stake in 2017, this holding has warranted “equity” accounting treatment. Early in 2023, Berkshire will purchase an additional interest in Pilot that will raise our ownership to 80% and lead to our fully consolidating Pilot’s earnings, assets and liabilities in our financial statements.
U.S. Treasury Bills
Berkshire’s balance sheet includes \$144 billion of cash and cash equivalents (excluding the holdings of BNSF and BHE). Of this sum, \$120 billion is held in U.S. Treasury bills, all maturing in less than a year. That stake leaves Berkshire financing about $\frac{1}{2}$ of 1% of the publicly-held national debt.
Charlie and I have pledged that Berkshire (along with our subsidiaries other than BNSF and BHE) will always hold more than \$30 billion of cash and equivalents. We want your company to be financially impregnable and never dependent on the kindness of strangers (or even that of friends). Both of us like to sleep soundly, and we want our creditors, insurance claimants and you to do so as well.
But \$144 billion?
That imposing sum, I assure you, is not some deranged expression of patriotism. Nor have Charlie and I lost our overwhelming preference for business ownership. Indeed, I first manifested my enthusiasm for that 80 years ago, on March 11, 1942, when I purchased three shares of Cities Services preferred stock. Their cost was \$114.75 and required all of my savings. (The Dow Jones Industrial Average that day closed at 99, a fact that should scream to you: Never bet against America.)
After my initial plunge, I always kept at least 80% of my net worth in equities. My $favored$ status throughout that period was 100% – and still is. Berkshire's current 80%-or-so position in businesses is a consequence of my failure to find entire companies or small portions thereof (that is, marketable stocks) which meet our criteria for long-term holding.
Charlie and I have endured similar cash-heavy positions from time to time in the past. These periods are never pleasant; they are also never permanent. And, fortunately, we have had a mildly attractive alternative during 2020 and 2021 for deploying capital. Read on.
Share Repurchases
There are three ways that we can increase the value of your investment. The first is always front and center in our minds: Increase the long-term earning power of Berkshire's controlled businesses through internal growth or by making acquisitions. Today, internal opportunities deliver far better returns than acquisitions. The size of those opportunities, however, is small compared to Berkshire's resources.
Our second choice is to buy non-controlling part-interests in the many good or great businesses that are publicly traded. From time to time, such possibilities are both numerous and blatantly attractive. Today, though, we find little that excites us.
That's largely because of a truism: Long-term interest rates that are low push the prices of all productive investments upward, whether these are stocks, apartments, farms, oil wells, whatever. Other factors influence valuations as well, but interest rates will always be important.
Our final path to value creation is to repurchase Berkshire shares. Through that simple act, we increase your share of the many controlled and non-controlled businesses Berkshire owns. When the price/value equation is right, this path is the easiest and most certain way for us to increase your wealth. (Alongside the accretion of value to continuing shareholders, a couple of other parties gain: Repurchases are modestly beneficial to the seller of the repurchased shares and to society as well.)
Periodically, as alternative paths become unattractive, repurchases make good sense for Berkshire's owners. During the past two years, we therefore repurchased 9% of the shares that were outstanding at yearend 2019 for a total cost of \$51.7 billion. That expenditure left our continuing shareholders owning about 10% more of all Berkshire businesses, whether these are wholly-owned (such as BNSF and GEICO) or partly-owned (such as Coca-Cola and Moody's).
I want to underscore that for Berkshire repurchases to make sense, our shares must offer appropriate value. We don't want to overpay for the shares of other companies, and it would be value-destroying if we were to overpay when we are buying Berkshire. As of February 23, 2022, since yearend we repurchased additional shares at a cost of \$1.2 billion. Our appetite remains large but will always remain price-dependent.
It should be noted that Berkshire's buyback opportunities are limited because of its high-class investor base. If our shares were heavily held by short-term speculators, both price volatility and transaction volumes would materially increase. That kind of reshaping would offer us far greater opportunities for creating value by making repurchases. Nevertheless, Charlie and I far prefer the owners we have, even though their admirable buy-and-keep attitudes limit the extent to which long-term shareholders can profit from opportunistic repurchases.
Finally, one easily-overlooked value calculation specific to Berkshire: As we’ve discussed, insurance “float” of the right sort is of great value to us. As it happens, repurchases automatically increase the amount of “float” per share. That figure has increased during the past two years by 25% – going from \$79,387 per “A” share to \$99,497, a meaningful gain that, as noted, owes some thanks to repurchases.
A Wonderful Man and a Wonderful Business
Last year, Paul Andrews died. Paul was the founder and CEO of TTI, a Fort Worth-based subsidiary of Berkshire. Throughout his life – in both his business and his personal pursuits – Paul quietly displayed all the qualities that Charlie and I admire. His story should be told.
In 1971, Paul was working as a purchasing agent for General Dynamics when the roof fell in. After losing a huge defense contract, the company fired thousands of employees, including Paul.
With his first child due soon, Paul decided to bet on himself, using \$500 of his savings to found Tex-Tronics (later renamed TTI). The company set itself up to distribute small electronic components, and first-year sales totaled \$112,000. Today, TTI markets more than one million different items with annual volume of \$7.7 billion.
But back to 2006: Paul, at 63, then found himself happy with his family, his job, and his associates. But he had one nagging worry, heightened because he had recently witnessed a friend's early death and the disastrous results that followed for that man's family and business. What, Paul asked himself in 2006, would happen to the many people depending on him if he should unexpectedly die?
For a year, Paul wrestled with his options. Sell to a competitor? From a strictly economic viewpoint, that course made the most sense. After all, competitors could envision lucrative “synergies” – savings that would be achieved as the acquiror slashed duplicated functions at TTI.
But . . . Such a purchaser would most certainly also retain its CFO, its legal counsel, its HR unit. Their TTI counterparts would therefore be sent packing. And ugh! If a new distribution center were to be needed, the acquirer's home city would certainly be favored over Fort Worth.
Whatever the financial benefits, Paul quickly concluded that selling to a competitor was not for him. He next considered seeking a financial buyer, a species once labeled – aptly so – a leveraged buyout firm. Paul knew, however, that such a purchaser would be focused on an “exit strategy.” And who could know what that would be? Brooding over it all, Paul found himself having no interest in handing his 35-year-old creation over to a reseller.
When Paul met me, he explained why he had eliminated these two alternatives as buyers. He then summed up his dilemma by saying – in far more tactful phrasing than this – “After a year of pondering the alternatives, I want to sell to Berkshire because you are the only guy left.” So, I made an offer and Paul said “Yes.” One meeting; one lunch; one deal.
To say we both lived happily ever after is an understatement. When Berkshire purchased TTI, the company employed 2,387. Now the number is 8,043. A large percentage of that growth took place in Fort Worth and environs. Earnings have increased 673%.
Annually, I would call Paul and tell him his salary should be substantially increased. Annually, he would tell me, “We can talk about that next year, Warren; I’m too busy now.”
When Greg Abel and I attended Paul's memorial service, we met children, grandchildren, long-time associates (including TTI's first employee) and John Roach, the former CEO of a Fort Worth company Berkshire had purchased in 2000. John had steered his friend Paul to Omaha, instinctively knowing we would be a match.
At the service, Greg and I heard about the multitudes of people and organizations that Paul had silently supported. The breadth of his generosity was extraordinary – geared always to improving the lives of others, particularly those in Fort Worth.
In all ways, Paul was a class act.
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Good luck – occasionally extraordinary luck – has played its part at Berkshire. If Paul and I had not enjoyed a mutual friend – John Roach – TTI would not have found its home with us. But that ample serving of luck was only the beginning. TTI was soon to lead Berkshire to its most important acquisition.
Every fall, Berkshire directors gather for a presentation by a few of our executives. We sometimes choose the site based upon the location of a recent acquisition, by that means allowing directors to meet the new subsidiary's CEO and learn more about the acquiree's activities.
In the fall of 2009, we consequently selected Fort Worth so that we could visit TTI. At that time, BNSF, which also had Fort Worth as its hometown, was the third-largest holding among our marketable equities. Despite that large stake, I had never visited the railroad's headquarters.
Deb Bosanek, my assistant, scheduled our board's opening dinner for October 22. Meanwhile, I arranged to arrive earlier that day to meet with Matt Rose, CEO of BNSF, whose accomplishments I had long admired. When I made the date, I had no idea that our get-together would coincide with BNSF's third-quarter earnings report, which was released late on the $22^{\text{nd}}$ .
The market reacted badly to the railroad's results. The Great Recession was in full force in the third quarter, and BNSF's earnings reflected that slump. The economic outlook was also bleak, and Wall Street wasn't feeling friendly to railroads – or much else.
On the following day, I again got together with Matt and suggested that Berkshire would offer the railroad a better long-term home than it could expect as a public company. I also told him the maximum price that Berkshire would pay.
Matt relayed the offer to his directors and advisors. Eleven busy days later, Berkshire and BNSF announced a firm deal. And here I'll venture a rare prediction: BNSF will be a key asset for Berkshire and our country a century from now.
The BNSF acquisition would never have happened if Paul Andrews hadn't sized up Berkshire as the right home for TTI.
Thanks
I taught my first investing class 70 years ago. Since then, I have enjoyed working almost every year with students of all ages, finally “retiring” from that pursuit in 2018.
Along the way, my toughest audience was my grandson's fifth-grade class. The 11-year-olds were squirming in their seats and giving me blank stares until I mentioned Coca-Cola and its famous secret formula. Instantly, every hand went up, and I learned that “secrets” are catnip to kids.
Teaching, like writing, has helped me develop and clarify my own thoughts. Charlie calls this phenomenon the orangutan effect: If you sit down with an orangutan and carefully explain to it one of your cherished ideas, you may leave behind a puzzled primate, but will yourself exit thinking more clearly.
Talking to university students is far superior. I have urged that they seek employment in (1) the field and (2) with the kind of people they would select, if they had no need for money. Economic realities, I acknowledge, may interfere with that kind of search. Even so, I urge the students never to give up the quest, for when they find that sort of job, they will no longer be “working.”
Charlie and I, ourselves, followed that liberating course after a few early stumbles. We both started as part-timers at my grandfather's grocery store, Charlie in 1940 and I in 1942. We were each assigned boring tasks and paid little, definitely not what we had in mind. Charlie later took up law, and I tried selling securities. Job satisfaction continued to elude us.
Finally, at Berkshire, we found what we love to do. With very few exceptions, we have now “worked” for many decades with people whom we like and trust. It’s a joy in life to join with managers such as Paul Andrews or the Berkshire families I told you about last year. In our home office, we employ decent and talented people – no jerks. Turnover averages, perhaps, one person per year.
I would like, however, to emphasize a further item that turns our jobs into fun and satisfaction - - - - working for you. There is nothing more rewarding to Charlie and me than enjoying the trust of individual long-term shareholders who, for many decades, have joined us with the expectation that we would be a reliable custodian of their funds.
Obviously, we can't select our owners, as we could do if our form of operation were a partnership. Anyone can buy shares of Berkshire today with the intention of soon reselling them. For sure, we get a few of that type of shareholder, just as we get index funds that own huge amounts of Berkshire simply because they are required to do so.
To a truly unusual degree, however, Berkshire has as owners a very large corps of individuals and families that have elected to join us with an intent approaching “til death do us part.” Often, they have trusted us with a large – some might say excessive – portion of their savings.
Berkshire, these shareholders would sometimes acknowledge, might be far from the best selection they could have made. But they would add that Berkshire would rank high among those with which they would be most comfortable. And people who are comfortable with their investments will, on average, achieve better results than those who are motivated by ever-changing headlines, chatter and promises.
Long-term individual owners are both the “partners” Charlie and I have always sought and the ones we constantly have in mind as we make decisions at Berkshire. To them we say, “It feels good to ‘work’ for you, and you have our thanks for your trust.”
The Annual Meeting
Clear your calendar! Berkshire will have its annual gathering of capitalists in Omaha on Friday, April 29 $^{th}$ through Sunday, May 1 $^{st}$ . The details regarding the weekend are laid out on pages A-1 and A-2. Omaha eagerly awaits you, as do I.
I will end this letter with a sales pitch. “Cousin” Jimmy Buffett has designed a pontoon “party” boat that is now being manufactured by Forest River, a Berkshire subsidiary. The boat will be introduced on April 29 at our Berkshire Bazaar of Bargains. And, for two days only, shareholders will be able to purchase Jimmy’s masterpiece at a 10% discount. Your bargain-hunting chairman will be buying a boat for his family’s use. Join me.
February 26, 2022
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
伯克希尔业绩 vs. 标普500
| 年度百分比变化 | ||
| 伯克希尔每股市场价值 | 标普500（含股息） | |
| 年份 | ||
| 1965 | 49.5 | 10.0 |
| 1966 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
| 1995 | 57.4 | 37.6 |
| 1996 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| 2018 | 2.8 | (4.4) |
| 2019 | 11.0 | 31.5 |
| 2020 | 2.4 | 18.4 |
| 2021 | 29.6 | 28.7 |
| 复利年增长率 – 1965-2021 | 20.1% | 10.5% |
| 总增长率 – 1964-2021 | 3,641,613% | 30,209% |
注：数据以日历年统计，以下年份除外：1965和1966年，截至9月30日；1967年，15个月截至12月31日。
伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
我和我的长期搭档Charlie Munger负责管理你们的一部分储蓄。你们的信任让我们深感荣幸。
这一位置也要求我们承担起一份责任：把如果我们只是远方的股东、你们才是管理者时我们想知道的事，向你们汇报。我们乐于通过这封年度信函以及年度股东大会，与各位直接沟通。
我们的政策是平等对待所有股东。因此，我们不与分析师或大型机构进行讨论。此外，只要可能，我们会在周六早上发布重要信息，以便在周一市场开盘前，给股东和媒体留出最充足的时间来消化这些消息。
伯克希尔的大量事实和数据都在公司每年向证券交易委员会（SEC）提交的10-K年报中呈现，我们在K-1至K-119页重印了该报告。有些股东会觉得这些细节引人入胜；另一些股东则只想知道查理和我认为伯克希尔有哪些新鲜或有趣的事。
唉，2021年这种动作寥寥无几。不过，我们在提升你们股票的内在价值方面确实取得了合理的进展。这项任务是我57年来的首要职责。而且将继续如此。
你拥有什么
伯克希尔拥有各种各样的企业，有些是全资拥有，有些只是部分持股。第二部分主要是美国大公司的可流通普通股。此外，我们还持有一部分非美国股票，并参与了几家合资企业或其他合作活动。
无论我们的所有权形式如何，我们的目标都是对有持久经济优势和一流CEO的企业进行有意义的投资。请特别注意，我们持有股票是基于对其长期业务表现的预期，而不是因为我们将其视为把握市场时机的工具。这一点至关重要：查理和我不是选股者，我们是选企业者。
我犯过很多错误。因此，我们广泛的企业收藏包括一些经济特质真正卓越的企业，许多其他拥有良好经济特征的企业，以及少数边缘企业。我们普通股部分的一个优点是——偶尔——很容易以美妙的价格买入美妙企业的一小部分。这种“瓮中捉鳖”（shooting-fish-in-a-barrel）般的经历在谈判交易中非常罕见，而且永远不会大规模出现。此外，在公开市场上犯错后，退出也容易得多。
意外，意外
这里有几件关于你们公司的事，甚至连经验丰富的投资者也常常感到意外：
- 许多人认为伯克希尔是一个庞大且有些奇怪的金融资产集合体。事实上，伯克希尔拥有并运营的美国“基础设施”资产——在我们的资产负债表上归类为不动产、厂房和设备——比任何其他美国公司都多。这种优势从来不是我们的目标。然而，它已成为事实。
年末，这些国内基础设施资产在伯克希尔的资产负债表上以1580亿美元列示。这个数字去年有所增长，并将继续增长。伯克希尔将始终建设。
- 每年，你们的公司都会缴纳巨额联邦所得税。例如，2021年我们支付了33亿美元，而美国财政部报告的企业所得税总收入为4020亿美元。此外，伯克希尔还缴纳了大量州税和外国税。伯克希尔的股东说“我在公司已经捐过了”是无可辩驳的断言。
伯克希尔的历史生动地说明了政府与美国企业之间无形且常常不被承认的财务伙伴关系。我们的故事始于1955年初，当时Berkshire Fine Spinning（伯克希尔精细纺纱）和Hathaway Manufacturing（哈撒韦制造）同意合并业务。在寻求股东批准时，这些历史悠久的新英格兰纺织公司对合并表达了很高的期望。
例如，哈撒韦的征求信向其股东保证：“资源和管理的结合，将造就纺织行业中最强大、最高效的组织之一。”这种乐观看法得到了公司顾问雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）（是的，就是那个雷曼兄弟）的认可。
我敢肯定，无论是在福尔里弗（伯克希尔）还是新贝德福德（哈撒韦），两家公司合并的那天都是个欢乐的日子。然而，当乐队停止演奏、银行家们回家之后，股东们却迎来了灾难。
合并后的九年里，伯克希尔的股东眼睁睁看着公司的净资产从5140万美元暴跌至2210万美元。这一下滑部分源于股票回购、不明智的分红以及工厂关闭。但与此同时，数以千计的员工辛苦劳作九年，换来的却是经营亏损。伯克希尔的挣扎并非特例：新英格兰纺织业已经悄无声息地步入一场漫长且不可逆转的死亡行军。
合并后的九年里，美国财政部同样因伯克希尔的困境而受损。在这段时期，公司总共只向政府缴纳了337,359美元的所得税——寒酸得每天只有100美元。
1965年初，情况发生了变化。伯克希尔启用了新的管理层，他们重新调配了可用现金，并将几乎所有盈利都投入到一系列优质企业中，这些企业大多多年来一直表现良好。将盈利再投资与复利的力量结合起来，产生了神奇的效应，股东们因此获益。
需要指出的是，伯克希尔的股东并非这次路线调整的唯一受益者。他们的"沉默合伙人"——美国财政部——陆续从公司收到了数百亿美元的所得税。还记得每天100美元吗？如今，伯克希尔每天向财政部缴纳约900万美元。
公平地对待我们的政府合伙人，我们的股东应当承认——甚至大声宣扬——伯克希尔的繁荣在很大程度上得益于公司是在美国运营这一事实。如果没有伯克希尔，我们的国家自1965年以来也会发展得很好。然而，如果没有美国这个家园，伯克希尔永远不可能接近今天的样子。当你看到国旗时，请说声谢谢。
- 从1967年以860万美元收购国民保险公司开始，伯克希尔已成为保险"浮存金"领域的全球领导者——浮存金是我们持有并可以投资，但并不属于我们的资金。包括人寿保险带来的一小部分资金，伯克希尔的浮存金总额已从我们进入保险业时的1900万美元增长到1470亿美元。
- 到目前为止，这些浮存金的成本对我们来说是负的。尽管我们在许多年份里，保险损失加上经营费用超过了保费收入，但总体而言，我们从产生浮存金的承销活动中赚取了微薄的55年利润。
- 同样重要的是，浮存金非常稳定。归属于我们保险业务的资金每天都在流入流出，但其总量不会急剧下降。因此，在投资浮存金时，我们可以着眼于长期。
如果你还不熟悉浮存金的概念，我建议你阅读A-5页上的详细解释。令我惊讶的是，去年我们的浮存金增加了90亿美元，这对伯克希尔的股东来说是一笔重要的增值，尽管它并未体现在我们按美国通用会计准则（GAAP）报告的盈利和净资产中。
我们保险业务创造的巨大价值，很大程度上归功于伯克希尔的好运气——我在1986年聘用了Ajit Jain。我们第一次见面是在一个星期六的早上，我很快问Ajit他有什么保险经验。他回答："没有。"
我说："人无完人"，然后就录用了他。那是我的幸运日：事实上，Ajit是再完美不过的选择了。更棒的是，35年后的今天，他依然出色。
关于保险的最后一点想法：我相信，伯克希尔很可能——但远非确定——能够在不产生长期承销亏损的情况下维持其浮存金。然而，我确信在有些年份我们会遭遇这样的亏损，甚至可能涉及非常庞大的金额。
伯克希尔的构建方式使其能应对任何其他保险公司都无法承受的灾难性事件——这一优先级在查理和我离开后仍将长期延续。
我们的四大巨头
通过伯克希尔，我们的股东拥有数十家企业。其中一些企业自身又拥有一批子公司。例如，Marmon 拥有超过 100 个独立业务运营，从铁路车厢租赁到医疗设备制造，不一而足。
——尽管如此，我们"四大"公司的运营占据了伯克希尔价值的很大一部分。排在首位的是我们的保险集团。伯克希尔实质上拥有该集团 100% 的股份，其巨额浮存金我们此前已描述过。这些保险公司的投资资产因我们用于支撑其承诺的庞大资本而进一步扩大。
保险业务是为伯克希尔量身定做的。这个产品永远不会过时，销售量通常会随着经济增长和通胀而增加。此外，诚信和资本将永远重要。我们的公司能够且将会表现出色。
当然，还有其他保险公司拥有出色的商业模式和前景。但要复制伯克希尔的运营，几乎是不可能的。
——苹果——按年末市值计算，是我们的第二大巨头——是一种不同类型的持股。在这里，我们的所有权仅为 5.55%，高于一年前的 5.39%。这一增幅听起来像小土豆。但请考虑一下：苹果 2021 年收益的每 0.1% 就相当于 1 亿美元。我们没有花费任何伯克希尔资金就获得了这一增量。苹果的股份回购做到了这一点。
重要的是要理解，只有苹果的股息才计入伯克希尔报告的 GAAP 收益中——去年，苹果向我们支付了 7.85 亿美元的股息。然而，我们在苹果收益中的"份额"高达惊人的 56 亿美元。该公司留存收益的大部分用于回购苹果股票，我们对此表示赞赏。苹果杰出的 CEO Tim Cook 理所当然地将苹果产品的用户视为他的初恋，但他所有其他利益相关者也同样受益于 Tim 的管理才能。
——BNSF，我们的第三大巨头，仍然是美国商业的头号动脉，这使其成为美国和伯克希尔不可或缺的资产。如果 BNSF 运输的许多重要产品改由卡车运输，美国的碳排放量将飙升。
你们的铁路公司在 2021 年实现了 60 亿美元的创纪录收益。这里应该指出，我们谈论的是我们偏好的那种老式收益：扣除利息、税款、折旧、摊销和所有形式的补偿后计算得出的数字。（我们的定义暗示一个警告：随着股票上涨，对收益的欺骗性"调整"——用礼貌的说法——已变得既更频繁又更异想天开。说得更不客气些，我会说牛市催生吹牛的牛……）
BNSF 的列车去年行驶了 1.43 亿英里，运输了 5.35 亿吨货物。这两项成就都远超其他任何美国铁路公司。你们可以为自己的铁路感到自豪。
——BHE，我们的最后一家巨头，在 2021 年实现了 40 亿美元的创纪录收益。这比 2000 年（伯克希尔首次购入 BHE 股份的年份）的 1.22 亿美元收益增长了 30 倍以上。现在，伯克希尔持有该公司 91.1% 的股份。
BHE 的社会成就记录与其财务业绩一样引人注目。该公司在 2000 年没有风电或太阳能发电。当时它仅被视为庞大电力行业中的一个相对较新且较小的参与者。随后，在 David Sokol 和 Greg Abel 的领导下，BHE 已成为一家电力巨头（请别抱怨这个双关）和全美大部分地区风电、太阳能及输电领域的领先力量。
格雷格关于这些成就的报告出现在第A-3和A-4页。你在那里看到的介绍绝不是眼下流行的那些“洗绿”故事。自2007年以来，BHE每年都忠实地详细说明其在可再生能源和输电方面的计划和业绩。
如需进一步查阅这些信息，请访问BHE的网站brkenergy.com。在那里，你会看到这家公司长期以来一直在做出气候意识行动，这些行动耗尽了其所有收益。未来还有更多机会。BHE拥有管理、经验、资本和胃口，足以承担我们国家所需的大型电力项目。
投资
现在我们来谈谈我们未控股的公司，这份清单再次提到了苹果。下面列出我们最大的十五项股权投资，其中几项是伯克希尔两位长期投资经理Todd Combs和Ted Weschler的选择。到年底，这对有价值的搭档总共负责管理340亿美元的投资，其中许多未达到我们在表格中使用的门槛价值。此外，Todd和Ted管理的资金中很大一部分存于伯克希尔旗下企业的各种养老金计划中，这些计划的资产未包含在此表中。
| 持股比例 | 2021年12月31日 | |||
| 股份数 | 公司 | 成本* | 市值 | |
| （单位：百万美元） | ||||
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 19.9 | 1,287 | 24,804 |
| 907,559,761 | Apple Inc. | 5.6 | 31,089 | 161,155 |
| 1,032,852,006 | Bank of America Corp. | 12.8 | 14,631 | 45,952 |
| 66,835,615 | The Bank of New York Mellon Corp. | 8.3 | 2,918 | 3,882 |
| 225,000,000 | BYD Co. Ltd.** | 7.7 | 232 | 7,693 |
| 3,828,941 | Charter Communications, Inc. | 2.2 | 643 | 2,496 |
| 38,245,036 | Chevron Corporation | 2.0 | 3,420 | 4,488 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.2 | 1,299 | 23,684 |
| 52,975,000 | General Motors Company | 3.6 | 1,616 | 3,106 |
| 89,241,000 | ITOCHU Corporation | 5.6 | 2,099 | 2,728 |
| 81,714,800 | Mitsubishi Corporation | 5.5 | 2,102 | 2,593 |
| 93,776,200 | Mitsui & Co., Ltd. | 5.7 | 1,621 | 2,219 |
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation | 13.3 | 248 | 9,636 |
| 143,456,055 | U.S. Bancorp | 9.7 | 5,384 | 8,058 |
| 158,824,575 | Verizon Communications Inc. | 3.8 | 9,387 | 8,253 |
| 其他*** | 26,629 | 39,972 | ||
| 按市值计价的股权投资总计 | $ 104,605 | $ 350,719 | ||
- 这是我们实际购买价格，也是我们的税基。
** 由BHE持有；因此，伯克希尔股东仅持有该头寸91.1%的权益。
*** 包括对西方石油公司（Occidental Petroleum）100亿美元的投资，包括优先股和购买普通股的认股权证，这一组合目前估值为107亿美元。
除了脚注中提到的西方石油持仓以及我们各种普通股头寸外，伯克希尔还持有卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）26.6%的权益（采用“权益法”核算，而非按市值计价，账面价值131亿美元），以及38.6%的Pilot Corp.权益，后者是一家旅行中心领导者，去年收入为450亿美元。
自2017年我们购入Pilot（旅行中心运营商）的股权以来，这项投资一直采用"权益法"会计处理。2023年初，伯克希尔将进一步增持Pilot的股份，使持股比例达到80%，并将在我们的财务报表中完全合并Pilot的收益、资产和负债。
美国国库券
伯克希尔的资产负债表上持有1,440亿美元的现金及现金等价物（不含BNSF和BHE的持有）。其中1,200亿美元投资于美国国库券，全部期限在一年以内。这一仓位使伯克希尔为美国公开发行的国债提供了约0.5%的融资。
查理和我已承诺，伯克希尔（以及BNSF和BHE之外的子公司）将始终持有超过300亿美元的现金及等价物。我们希望您的公司在财务上坚不可摧，永远不必依赖陌生人的善意（甚至朋友的善意）。我们俩都喜欢睡得安稳，也希望我们的债权人、保险理赔人和您也能如此。
但1,440亿美元？
我向您保证，这笔庞大的数字并非某种狂热的爱国主义表现。查理和我也没有放弃对商业所有权的压倒性偏好。事实上，我对这种偏好的热情最早可以追溯到80年前——1942年3月11日，我买了三股城市服务优先股，花费114.75美元，用尽了我全部积蓄。（那天道琼斯工业平均指数收于99点——这个事实应该对你大喊：永远不要做空美国。）
从那次初试锋芒之后，我一直将至少80%的净资产投入股票。我一生中最偏爱的状态是100%投入——现在依然如此。伯克希尔目前约80%的仓位配置在生意上，是因为我未能找到完全符合我们长期持有标准的整个公司或小部分股权（即可交易股票）所致。
过去，查理和我也曾不时经历过类似的现金重仓时期。这些时期从来都不令人愉快，但也从来不会永久持续。而且幸运的是，在2020年和2021年，我们有一个还算有吸引力的替代选择来部署资本。请继续阅读。
股份回购
我们可以通过三种方式提升您的投资价值。第一种始终是我们心中的重中之重：通过内部增长或收购来提升伯克希尔控股业务的长期盈利能力。如今，内部机会带来的回报远高于收购。但这些机会的规模相对于伯克希尔的资源而言仍显渺小。
我们的第二种选择是买入众多优秀或卓越的上市公司的非控股部分权益。时不时地，这类机会既多又显而易见地诱人。然而今天，我们几乎找不到让我们兴奋的标的。
这很大程度上源于一个常识：长期利率走低会推高所有生产性投资的价格——无论是股票、公寓、农场、油井还是其他。其他因素也会影响估值，但利率始终至关重要。
我们创造价值的最后一条路径是回购伯克希尔的股票。通过这一简单操作，我们增加了您在伯克希尔旗下众多控股和非控股企业中所占的份额。当价格/价值等式合理时，这条路径是我们增加您财富的最简单、最确定的方式。（除了持续股东的价值提升，另外两方也能获益：回购对出售回购股份的卖方以及整个社会也略有好处。）
时不时地，当其他路径变得不再有吸引力时，股份回购对伯克希尔的股东而言就是明智之举。因此，在过去的两年里，我们以总计517亿美元的成本，回购了2019年底在外流通股份的9%。这笔支出让我们现有股东对伯克希尔旗下所有企业的持股比例增加了约10%，无论这些企业是全资控股（如BNSF和GEICO）还是部分持股（如可口可乐和穆迪）。
我想强调一点：要让伯克希尔的回购有意义，我们的股价必须提供合理的价值。我们不想为其他公司的股票支付过高的价格，如果在回购伯克希尔自身股份时出价太高，那也是在破坏价值。截至2022年2月23日，自去年底以来，我们又斥资12亿美元回购了额外股份。我们的胃口依然很大，但永远会以价格为前提。
值得一提的是，伯克希尔的回购机会受到限制，原因是我们拥有高素质的股东基础。如果我们的股份大量被短期投机者持有，那么股价波动性和交易量都会大幅增加。这种重塑将为我们创造通过回购来增值的更大机会。尽管如此，查理和我还是更偏爱我们现有的股东，尽管他们令人钦佩的"买而持"态度限制了长期股东从机会性回购中获利的空间。
最后，还有一个伯克希尔独有的、容易被忽视的价值计算：正如我们讨论过的，恰当的保险"浮存金"对我们价值巨大。巧合的是，股份回购会自动增加每股的"浮存金"金额。在过去两年里，这一数字增长了25%——从每股A类股的79,387美元增加到99,497美元。这是一项有意义的增长，如之前所述，部分功劳要归于股份回购。
一位了不起的人与一家了不起的企业
去年，Paul Andrews去世了。Paul是TTI的创始人兼CEO，这家总部位于沃斯堡的公司是伯克希尔的子公司。在他的一生中——无论是商业还是个人追求——Paul都默默展现出查理和我所钦佩的所有品质。他的故事值得一讲。
1971年，Paul在通用动力公司担任采购员时，天塌了下来。公司失去了一份巨大的国防合同后，解雇了数千名员工，Paul也在其中。
当时他的第一个孩子即将出生，Paul决定赌在自己身上，用500美元的积蓄创立了Tex-Tronics（后更名为TTI）。这家公司专营小型电子元件的分销，第一年销售额为11.2万美元。如今，TTI销售超过100万种不同产品，年营收达77亿美元。
回到2006年：那时63岁的Paul对家庭、工作和同事都感到满意。但他有一个挥之不去的担忧，因为他最近目睹了一位朋友的早逝，以及随后给那人家庭和企业带来的灾难性后果。Paul在2006年问自己：如果自己意外去世，那些依靠他的人会怎样？
Paul用了一年的时间权衡各种选择。卖给竞争对手？从纯粹的经济角度看，这条道路最有道理。毕竟，竞争对手可以预见丰厚的"协同效应"——收购方削减TTI的重复职能所能实现的节省。
但是……这样的买家很可能会保留自己的CFO、法务顾问和人力资源部门。那么TTI的对应人员就会被扫地出门。而且，天哪！如果需要一个新配送中心，买家所在城市必然比沃斯堡更有优势。
无论财务上能带来多少好处，保罗很快得出结论：把公司卖给竞争对手不是他的选择。他接着考虑寻找一个财务买家——这类买家曾被恰如其分地称为“杠杆收购公司”。但保罗知道，这样的买家会专注于“退出策略”。而谁能知道那会是什么呢？思前想后，保罗发现自己毫无兴趣把自己经营了35年的心血交给一个“倒卖者”。
当保罗见到我时，他解释了为什么排除了这两种买家。然后，他用比这委婉得多的措辞总结了自己的两难处境：“花了一年时间权衡各种选择后，我想把公司卖给伯克希尔，因为你是唯一剩下的那个人。”于是我出了价，保罗说“成交”。一次会面，一顿午餐，一桩交易。
说我们从此过上了幸福的生活，那还太轻描淡写了。伯克希尔收购TTI时，公司员工有2,387人。现在这个数字是8,043人。其中很大一部分增长发生在沃斯堡及其周边地区。盈利增长了673%。
每年我都会给保罗打电话，告诉他应该大幅加薪。每年他都会对我说：“我们明年再谈这个吧，沃伦；我现在太忙了。”
当Greg Abel和我参加保罗的追悼会时，我们见到了他的子女、孙辈、长期同事（包括TTI的第一位员工），以及John Roach——伯克希尔在2000年收购的一家沃斯堡公司的前CEO。正是John把他的朋友保罗引荐到了奥马哈，他凭直觉知道我们会很合得来。
在追悼会上，我和Greg听到了保罗默默支持的无数人和组织。他的慷慨程度非同寻常——总是致力于改善他人的生活，尤其是沃斯堡的人们。
方方面面，保罗都是一个真正有品格的人。
好运——偶尔是异乎寻常的好运——在伯克希尔发挥了作用。如果保罗和我不是有共同的朋友John Roach，TTI就不会在伯克希尔找到归宿。但那份丰沛的好运只是个开始。TTI很快又引导伯克希尔完成了迄今为止最重要的一次收购。
每年秋天，伯克希尔的董事们都会聚在一起，听取我们几位高管的汇报。我们有时会根据近期收购的地点选择会议场地，这样董事们就能见到新子公司的CEO，并了解更多关于被收购企业的情况。
因此，在2009年秋天，我们选择了沃斯堡，以便参观TTI。当时，同样以沃斯堡为大本营的BNSF，是我们有价证券投资组合中的第三大持仓。尽管持有如此大的股份，我却从未去过这家铁路公司的总部。
我的助手Deb Bosanek将董事会的开幕晚宴安排在了10月22日。同时，我计划当天提前到达，会见BNSF的CEO Matt Rose，我一直钦佩他的成就。定下日期时，我完全没想到我们的会面会赶上BNSF第三季度财报的发布——该财报在22日傍晚才公布。
市场对铁路公司的业绩反应不佳。大衰退在第三季度全面爆发，BNSF的盈利也反映了那次下滑。经济前景同样黯淡，华尔街对铁路公司——或者说对大多数东西——都不友好。
第二天，我再次与Matt会面，并建议伯克希尔可以为铁路公司提供一个比作为上市公司更好的长期归宿。我还告诉他伯克希尔愿意支付的最高价格。
Matt将报价转达给了他的董事和顾问们。十一个繁忙的日子之后，伯克希尔和BNSF宣布了一项确定的协议。在这里，我斗胆做一个罕见的预测：一个世纪后，BNSF仍将是伯克希尔和我国的关键资产。
如果Paul Andrews没有认定伯克希尔是TTI的合适归宿，那么BNSF的收购就永远不会发生。
致谢
我70年前教了第一堂投资课。从那以后，几乎每年我都乐在其中，与各个年龄段的学生打交道，最终在2018年"退休"，告别了那个讲台。
一路走来，最难缠的听众是我孙子的五年级班。那些11岁的小朋友在座位上扭来扭去，对我一脸茫然，直到我提到可口可乐及其著名的秘密配方。瞬间，每只手都举了起来，于是我明白了——秘密对孩子们来说就像猫薄荷。
教学，和写作一样，帮助我理清并表达了自己的想法。查理把这个现象称为"大猩猩效应"：如果你坐下来，对着一只大猩猩仔细解释你某个珍视的想法，你可能会留下一只困惑的灵长类动物，但你自己走出来时，思路会变得更加清晰。
跟大学生交谈就好多了。我一直鼓励他们去找（1）自己热爱的领域，以及（2）如果不缺钱也会选择与之共事的那种人。我承认，经济现实可能会干扰这种选择。即便如此，我劝学生们永远不要放弃追寻——因为一旦找到那样的工作，他们就不再是"在工作"了。
查理和我自己，在早期经历几次挫折后，就走上了那条解放之路。我们俩都是从祖父的杂货店做兼职起步的——查理是1940年，我是1942年。我们都被分配了枯燥的任务，收入微薄，绝不是我们想要的。后来查理去学了法律，我试着卖证券。职业的满足感始终避我们而去。
最终，在伯克希尔·哈撒韦，我们找到了自己热爱做的事。除了极少数例外，几十年来我们一直在和那些我们喜欢且信任的人"共事"。和像Paul Andrews这样的经理人，或者去年我跟你们提起过的伯克希尔家族联手，是人生一大乐事。在我们总部，雇的都是正直能干的员工——没有烂人。人员流动率大概平均每年一人。
不过，我想强调另一件事，它让我们的工作充满了乐趣和满足感——那就是为你们工作。对查理和我来说，没有什么比赢得长期个人股东的信任更让人欣慰的了——几十年来，他们加入我们，期待我们能成为他们资金的可靠托管人。
显然，我们无法挑选我们的所有者，不像我们采用合伙制运营时那样。今天任何人都可以买入伯克希尔的股票并打算很快转手。当然，确实也有那么一小撮这样的股东，就像那些指数基金大量持有伯克希尔，仅仅是因为它们不得不那样做一样。
然而，在很大程度上，伯克希尔拥有一个非常庞大的个人和家族所有者群体，他们选择加入我们，抱着一种近乎"至死不渝"的意图。他们经常将储蓄的很大一部分——有些人可能会说过大的一部分——托付给我们。
这些股东有时也会承认，伯克希尔可能远非他们能做的最佳选择。但他们也会补充说，伯克希尔是让他们感到最舒服的投资之一。而对自己的投资感到舒服的人，平均而言会比那些被不断变化的头条新闻、噪音和承诺所驱动的人取得更好的结果。
长期个人所有者既是查理和我一直寻找的"合伙人"，也是我们在伯克希尔做决策时始终记挂的人。对他们，我们想说："为你们'工作'感觉真好，感谢你们的信任。"
年度股东大会
把日历清空！伯克希尔的资本家人士年度盛会将于4月29日（周五）至5月1日（周日）在奥马哈举行。这个周末的相关细节列在A-1和A-2页。奥马哈热切期盼着你们，我也是。
在信的最后，我要插播一则广告。我的“表弟”Jimmy Buffett设计了一款浮筒“派对”船，目前正由伯克希尔的子公司Forest River（森林河）生产。这款船将于4月29日在我们的“伯克希尔特卖市集”上首次亮相。而且，仅限两天，股东们可以以10%的折扣购买Jimmy的这件杰作。喜欢淘便宜货的董事长我自己也会买一艘给家人用。跟我来吧。
2022年2月26日
Warren E. Buffett
董事会主席