BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire's annual report. As a public company, we are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.
“Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were reversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors, trusting you with our savings.
This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60 years ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.”
Mistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire
Sometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve purchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both judgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and the 100% acquisitions of companies.
At other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.
A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.” Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however uncomfortable that may be.
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During the 2019-23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon, I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it has generally been happy talk and pictures.
I have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection, always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)
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At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually owes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well.
Pete Liegl – One of a Kind
Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete died in November, still working at 80.
I first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about the company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100% owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.
I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28 $^{th}$ meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he could assure financial security for his family.
Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.
Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I recommend for general use.)
Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: “Well, I looked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay me \$100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he named a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what the company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I didn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem.
The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha's Happy Hollow Club and lived happily ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his performance.
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Every company doesn't have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few owners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I'm dealing.
But I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can make a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal advisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.
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One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to school. Never!
Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even by not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.)
Not long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner, long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited. Jessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6 $^{th}$ grade.”
I was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in lifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate with nature swamping nurture.
Pete Liegl was a natural.
Last Year's Performance
In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating businesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings of these highly-liquid short-term securities.
Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way, increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done. Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.
In general, property-casualty (“P/C”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024, reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been announcing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a truly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one per annum.
The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that appears later in this letter.
Berkshire's railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish.
Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to 100% at a cost of roughly \$3.9 billion, of which \$2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in Berkshire “B” shares.
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All told, we recorded operating earnings of \$47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly, some readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that are reported on page K-68.
Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else would we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and unpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year. In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes make the cash register ring like church bells.
Here's a breakdown of the 2023-24 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for us.
| (in $ millions) | ||
| 2024 | 2023 | |
| Insurance-underwriting | $ 9,020 | $ 5,428 |
| Insurance-investment income | 13,670 | 9,567 |
| BNSF | 5,031 | 5,087 |
| Berkshire Hathaway Energy | 3,730 | 2,331 |
| Other controlled businesses | 13,072 | 13,362 |
| Non-controlled businesses* | 1,519 | 1,750 |
| Other** | 1,395 | (175) |
| Operating earnings | $47,437 | $37,350 |
* Includes certain businesses in which Berkshire had between a 20% and 50% ownership such as Kraft Heinz, Occidental Petroleum and Berkadia.
** Includes foreign currency exchange gains of approximately \$1.1 billion in 2024 and approximately \$211 million in 2023 produced by our usage of non-U.S. dollar-denominated debt.
Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed
Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a mistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize, spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its business – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction.
The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire's destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had generally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be understandable for glamorous startups, but it's a blinking yellow light when it happens at a venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.
Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same company – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions.
To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled \$26.8 billion. That's about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.)
Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders during the same 1965-2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we disbursed our sole payment – \$101,755 or 10¢ per A share. (I can’t remember why I suggested this action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.)
For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S. Treasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than \$101 billion . . . and counting.
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Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the \$26.8 billion that we paid last year.
If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a \$1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of 2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our 2025 tax payments.
Where Your Money Is
Berkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%. These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems, many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments. We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.
In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and Moody's. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for their operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at \$272 billion. Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very occasionally, they sell at bargain prices.
We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon where we can best deploy your (and my family's) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very infrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to act at such times as did Charlie.
With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake. Berkshire's present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can't come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can't change management if that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the decisions being made.
With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for us.
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Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won't change. While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from \$354 billion to \$272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far greater than the value of the marketable portfolio.
Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority of their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.
Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country's short history, the U.S. has come close to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency.
Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country's citizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will continue to do so.
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One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by citizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now than ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems.
America is Exhibit A. Our country's progress over its mere 235 years of existence could not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted and the country's energies were unleashed.
True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own savings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.
The American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with their savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output beyond the dreams of any colonist.
From a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on, pitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.
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In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding.
Berkshire's activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished. Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal. Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.
However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the success it has been if Berkshire had never existed.
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So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on your part.
Property-Casualty Insurance
P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire's core business. The industry follows a financial model that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses.
Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment, etc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to ignore.
When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our product has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years. (We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years ago.)
This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing money – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is happening.
Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical malpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious profits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful: History reveals a large number of each species.
In recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed Berkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small underwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been sufficient.
We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our activities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally take our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.
Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of compensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not ensure foresight.
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P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for insurance.
Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.
It would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages, but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float but allowed more intelligent underwriting.
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No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That policy is corporate suicide.
Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”
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All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers (no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance delivers for investment.
Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated \$32 billion of after-tax profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our float has grown from \$46 billion to \$171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and, with intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.
Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments
A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in Japan.
It’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The five are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but others that operate throughout the world.
Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their managements and their attitude in respect to their investors.
Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.
Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting their boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire's holdings below $10\%$ of each company's shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire's ownership of all five increase somewhat.
At yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was \$13.8 billion and the market value of our holdings totaled \$23.5 billion.
Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality. We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included \$2.3 billion of after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which \$850 million occurred in 2024.
I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five companies in the future.
We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about \$812 million and the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about \$135 million.
The Annual Gathering in Omaha
I hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3 $^{rd}$ . We are following a somewhat changed schedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your questions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of Omaha. The city looks forward to your visits.
We will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire products that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday from noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks running shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.
Again, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie's Almanack and sold out – 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday.
This year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway. In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova, who among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand at putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full reign to use her imagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and design.
Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with her family. At this year's event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a $60^{\text{th}}$ Anniversary issue, featuring Charlie's photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.
Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently, we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.
Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing \$5,000 to the Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family, beginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed books, I will match.
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Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers, investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.
We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions between Becky and the audience.
Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at 10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.
You can find the full details regarding weekend activities on page 16. Note particularly the always-popular Brooks run on Sunday morning. (I will be sleeping.)
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My wise and good-looking sister, Bertie, of whom I wrote last year, will be attending the meeting along with two of her daughters, both good-looking as well. Observers all agree that the genes producing this dazzling result flow down only the female side of the family. (Sob.)
Bertie is now 91 and we talk regularly on Sundays using old-fashion telephones for communications. We cover the joys of old age and discuss such exciting topics as the relative merits of our canes. In my case, the utility is limited to the avoidance of falling flat on my face.
But Bertie regularly one-ups me by asserting that she enjoys an additional benefit: When a woman uses a cane, she tells me, men quit “hitting” on her. Bertie’s explanation is that the male ego is such that little old ladies with canes simply aren’t an appropriate target. Presently, I have no data to counter her assertion.
But I have suspicions. At the meeting I can't see much from the stage, and I would appreciate it if attendees would keep an eye on Bertie. Let me know if the cane is really doing its job. My bet is that she will be surrounded by males. For those of a certain age, the scene will bring back memories of Scarlett O'Hara and her horde of male admirers in Gone with the Wind.
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The Berkshire directors and I immensely enjoy having you come to Omaha, and I predict that you will have a good time and likely make some new friends.
February 22, 2025
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
Berkshire's Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change | |
| in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included | |
| 1965 | 49.5% | 10.0% |
| 1966 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.
Annual Percentage Change
| Year | in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire | in S&P 500 with Dividends Included |
| 1995 | 57.4% | 37.6% |
| 1996 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| 2018 | 2.8 | (4.4) |
| 2019 | 11.0 | 31.5 |
| 2020 | 2.4 | 18.4 |
| 2021 | 29.6 | 28.7 |
| 2022 | 4.0 | (18.1) |
| 2023 | 15.8 | 26.3 |
| 2024 | 25.5 | 25.0 |
| Compounded Annual Gain – 1965-2024 | 19.9% | 10.4% |
| Overall Gain – 1964-2024 | 5,502,284% | 39,054% |
伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司股东：
这封信是伯克希尔年度报告的一部分。作为一家上市公司，我们必须定期向各位通报许多具体事实与数字。
然而，"报告"二字意味着更大的责任。除了强制要求的数据之外，我们相信我们还欠各位一份额外的说明，关于你们拥有什么、以及我们如何思考。我们的目标是，以我们期望各位在自己位置上——也就是说，如果各位是伯克希尔的CEO，而我及家人是信任你们、将积蓄托付给你们的被动投资者——会采用的方式来与各位沟通。
这种思路引导我们每年都要如实陈述你们通过伯克希尔股票间接拥有的众多企业的好坏两面。不过，在讨论具体子公司的问题时，我们会尽量遵循 Tom Murphy 60年前给我的建议："点名表扬，分类批评。"
失误——是的，伯克希尔也会犯错
有时我在评估伯克希尔买入的某家企业的未来经济前景时犯了错——每一次都是资本配置失当。这种情况既发生在对有价证券（我们将其视为企业的部分所有权）的判断上，也发生在对公司的100%收购中。
另一些时候，我在评估伯克希尔聘用的管理者的能力或忠诚时犯了错。忠诚上的失望其伤害远超财务影响，那种痛苦几乎可以媲美一段失败的婚姻。
人事决策上能有个不错的安打率就该知足了。最致命的罪过是拖延纠错，或者用 Charlie Munger 的话说，"吮拇指"。他告诉我，问题不会因为你想让它们消失就消失。它们需要行动，无论行动有多么令人不快。
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在2019至2023年期间，我在给各位的信中共用了16次"错误"或"失误"一词。同期许多其他大公司从未使用过这两个词。我应该承认，亚马逊（Amazon）在2021年的信中有一些极其坦白的自省。除此之外，通常只有乐观的漂亮话和图片。
我也曾是多家大上市公司的董事，在这些公司中，"错误"或"搞错了"是董事会会议或分析师电话会上禁止出现的词。这种暗示管理层完美无缺的禁忌向来让我不安（尽管有时出于法律问题，限定讨论范围是明智的。我们生活在一个诉讼频发的社会。）
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我今年94岁，用不了多久 Greg Abel 就会接替我出任CEO，并由他来撰写年度信件。Greg 认同伯克希尔的信条：一份"报告"是伯克希尔CEO每年对所有者应尽的责任。他也明白，如果你开始糊弄你的股东，你很快就会相信自己编造的瞎话，连自己都被骗了。
Pete Liegl — 独一无二的人
请允许我暂停一下，讲一讲 Pete Liegl 的不凡故事。这位仁兄大多数伯克希尔股东都不熟悉，但他为股东们的总财富贡献了数十亿美元。Pete 于去年11月去世，享年80岁，直到最后一刻还在工作。
我第一次听说 Forest River——这家印第安纳州的公司由 Pete 创立并管理——是在2005年6月21日。那天我收到了一封来自中介的信，详细介绍了这家休闲车（RV）制造商的相关数据。写信人说，身为 Forest River 100%所有者的 Pete 特别想将公司卖给伯克希尔。他还告诉了我 Pete 期望的价格。我喜欢这种直截了当的方式。
我向一些RV经销商做了调查，对所了解的情况感到满意，于是安排了6月28日在奥马哈会面。Pete 带着他的妻子 Sharon 和女儿 Lisa 一起前来。会面时，Pete 向我保证他想继续经营这家企业，但如果能确保家人的财务安全，他会更安心。
接着，Pete 提到他名下还有一些房地产租给了Forest River，在6月21日的信中没有提及。几分钟之内，我们就为这些资产定好了价格——我说伯克希尔不需要评估，我直接接受他的估价。
接着我们谈到了另一个需要明确的问题。我问Pete他希望拿多少薪酬，并补充说，无论他报多少，我都接受。（不过我得加一句，这种做法我可不建议普遍使用。）
Pete停顿了一下，他的妻子、女儿和我都往前倾了倾身子。然后他让我们吃了一惊：“嗯，我看了伯克希尔的股东委托书，我不想比我的老板挣得多，所以每年给我10万美元吧。”我好不容易从地上爬起来，Pete又补充道：“不过今年我们会赚X（他说了一个数字），我希望每年能拿到超过公司目前盈利部分的10%作为年度奖金。”我回答说：“好的Pete，但如果Forest River进行重大收购，我们会根据新增的资本进行适当调整。”我没有定义“适当”或“重大”，但这些模糊的措辞从未引发过问题。
我们四个人随后去了奥马哈的Happy Hollow俱乐部共进晚餐，从此过上了幸福的生活。接下来的19年里，Pete大放异彩，没有哪个竞争对手能接近他的业绩。
并非每家公司都有容易理解的业务，像Pete这样的所有者或管理者也极为罕见。当然，我也预计自己在伯克希尔收购的企业上会犯不少错误，有时也会误判与我打交道的人。
但我也在业务潜力以及管理者的能力和诚信方面，经历过许多愉快的惊喜。我们的经验是，一个成功的决策随着时间的推移可以带来惊人的差异。（想想GEICO这个业务决策，Ajit Jain这个管理决策，以及我找到Charlie Munger这位独一无二的合伙人、个人顾问和坚定朋友的运气。）错误会消逝，而成功会永远绽放。
关于CEO的选拔，还有一点：我从不看候选人上过什么学校。从不！
当然，有很多优秀的管理者毕业于最著名的学校。但也有像Pete这样的人，他们可能受益于就读不那么知名的学校，甚至没有读完大学。看看我的朋友Bill Gates，他认定在一个即将改变世界的爆发式行业中起步远比留在学校拿一张可以挂在墙上的文凭重要得多。（读读他的新书《源代码》。）
不久前，我通过电话认识了Jessica Toonkel，她的继祖父Ben Rosner很久以前为我和Charlie经营过一家企业。Ben是个零售天才，在准备这份报告时，我向Jessica确认Ben的教育背景，我记得他受教育程度有限。Jessica回答说：“Ben只读到六年级。”
我有幸在三所优秀的大学接受了教育。我也坚信终身学习。然而，我观察到，商业天赋中很大一部分是与生俱来的，天性胜过后天培养。
Pete Liegl就是天生的。
去年业绩
2024年，伯克希尔的业绩比我预期的要好，尽管我们189家运营企业中有53%盈利下滑。我们受益于投资收入可预见的显著增长——国库券收益率提高，我们大幅增加了对这些高流动性短期证券的持有量。
我们的保险业务盈利也大幅增长，主要归功于GEICO的出色表现。在五年时间里，Todd Combs对GEICO进行了重大改造，提升了效率，使承销实践与时俱进。GEICO是一颗久藏的宝石，需要大幅度的重抛光，而Todd不知疲倦地完成了这项工作。虽然尚未完成，但2024年的改善令人瞩目。
总体而言，财产意外险（"P/C"）定价在2024年有所加强，反映出对流风暴造成的损失大幅增加。气候变化可能已经宣告其到来。不过，2024年没有发生任何"怪兽"级事件。未来某一天——任何一天——都可能发生一场真正惊人的保险损失，而且无法保证每年只发生一次。
财产意外险业务对伯克希尔至关重要，值得在本信后面进一步讨论。
伯克希尔的铁路和公用事业运营——这是我们除保险外最大的两项业务——合计盈利有所改善。然而，两者都有许多工作要做。
年底，我们将公用事业运营的持股从约92%增加到100%，耗资约39亿美元，其中29亿美元以现金支付，余额以伯克希尔"B"股支付。
总体而言，我们2024年的经营利润为474亿美元。我们经常（有些读者可能会抱怨——永无休止地）强调这一指标，而非美国通用会计准则规定的、列示于K-68页的盈利。
我们的指标排除了我们持有的股票和债券的资本利得或损失，无论已实现还是未实现。随着时间的推移，我们非常倾向于认为利得将占上风——不然我们为什么要买入这些证券？——尽管每年的数字会剧烈且不可预测地波动。我们对这类承诺的视野几乎总是远远超过一年。在很多情况下，我们的思考跨越数十年。正是这些长期投资有时让收银机像教堂钟声般叮当作响。
以下是我们对2023-2024年盈利的分解。所有数据均扣除折旧、摊销和所得税。EBITDA，华尔街钟爱的但有缺陷的指标，不适合我们。
| (单位：百万美元) | |
|---|---|
| 2024 | |
| 保险-承销业务 | $9,020 |
| 保险-投资收益 | 13,670 |
| 北伯林顿铁路（BNSF） | 5,031 |
| 伯克希尔哈撒韦能源 | 3,730 |
| 其他控股企业 | 13,072 |
| 非控股企业* | 1,519 |
| 其他** | 1,395 |
| 经营利润 | $47,437 |
包括伯克希尔持股在20%至50%之间的某些企业，如卡夫亨氏（Kraft Heinz）、西方石油（Occidental Petroleum）和伯卡迪亚（Berkadia）。
*包括2024年约11亿美元和2023年约2.11亿美元的外汇汇率收益，源自我们使用非美元计价债务。
惊喜，惊喜！一项重要的美国纪录被打破
六十年前，现任管理层接管了伯克希尔。那一步是一个错误——我的错误——并且困扰了我们二十年。我要强调，Charlie立刻发现了我的明显错误：尽管我支付的价格看起来便宜，但它的业务——一家庞大的北方纺织企业——正走向灭亡。
美国财政部——偏偏是财政部——早已悄无声息地收到过伯克希尔命运的预警。1965年，这家公司一毛钱所得税都没缴，这种窘境在它身上已持续了整整十年。对光鲜的初创企业而言，这种经济表现或许情有可原，但当它发生在美国工业的古老支柱身上，就是一盏闪烁的黄灯。伯克希尔正朝着垃圾堆滑去。
60年弹指一挥，想象一下财政部当时的惊讶：同一家公司——仍以伯克希尔·哈撒韦的名义运营——缴纳的企业所得税，竟比美国政府从任何一家公司收到的都要多，甚至超过了那些市值高达数万亿美元的美国科技巨头。
准确地说，伯克希尔去年向国税局分四次支付了268亿美元。这大约相当于全美企业纳税总额的5%。（此外，我们还向外国政府和44个州缴纳了可观的所得税。）
请注意一个关键因素，正是它促成了这次破纪录的纳税：在1965年至2024年的同一时期，伯克希尔股东只收到过一次现金分红。1967年1月3日，我们派发了唯一一次分红——101,755美元，合每股A类股10美分。（我已经记不清当初为什么向伯克希尔董事会提出这个建议。现在回想起来简直像一场噩梦。）
六十年来，伯克希尔股东持续支持再投资，使得公司得以积累应税收入。向美国财政部缴纳的现金所得税，第一个十年微乎其微，如今累计已超过1,010亿美元……而且还在增加。
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庞大的数字难以具象化。让我换个方式说说我们去年缴纳的268亿美元。
假如伯克希尔在2024年全年每隔20分钟就给财政部寄一张100万美元的支票——想象一下366个日日夜夜，因为2024年是闰年——我们到年底仍会欠联邦政府一大笔钱。事实上，要等到一月中旬，财政部才会告诉我们：可以喘口气、睡个觉，然后准备2025年的纳税了。
你的钱在哪
伯克希尔的股权投资是双管齐下的。一只手里，我们控制着许多企业，持有被投资方至少80%的股份。通常我们持有100%。这189家子公司与可交易的普通股有相似之处，但远非完全相同。它们合起来价值数千亿美元，其中包括几颗稀世珍宝、许多不错但远非卓越的企业，以及一些令人失望的落后者。我们没有任何一项是重大拖累，但确实有一些是我当初本不该买入的。
另一只手里，我们持有一打左右家喻户晓的超大型高盈利企业的少量股份，比如苹果、美国运通、可口可乐和穆迪。其中许多公司，其运营所需的净有形资产回报率极高。年底时，我们的部分持股价值为2,720亿美元。可以理解，真正杰出的企业极少整体出售，但这些珍宝的小额股份可以在华尔街周一至周五买到，并且偶尔会以低廉的价格成交。
我们在选择股权工具时一视同仁，根据哪里最能配置你（以及我家人的）储蓄来决定投资哪种类型。通常，没什么东西看起来有吸引力；极偶尔，我们会发现自己深陷机遇之中。Greg已经生动地展示了他抓住此类时机的能力，就像Charlie当年一样。
对有价股票而言，当我犯错时更容易调整方向。但需要强调的是，伯克希尔目前的规模削弱了这一宝贵选择——我们无法随心所欲地快速进出。建立或退出一项投资有时需要一年甚至更长时间。此外，持有少数股权时，我们既无法在必要时更换管理层，也无法在不满其决策时控制资本流向。
而对于控股公司，我们可以掌控这些决策，但纠正错误的灵活性却小得多。事实上，除非我们认定问题永无休止，否则伯克希尔几乎从不出售控股企业。作为补偿，正是因为我们这种坚定不移的作风，一些企业主会主动找上门来。这有时对我们来说是个明显的加分项。
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尽管一些评论人士目前认为伯克希尔持有异常庞大的现金头寸，但你们的绝大部分资金仍然配置在股票上。这种偏好不会改变。去年我们持有的有价股票从 3540 亿美元降至 2720 亿美元，但非上市控股企业的价值却有所增加，且远超上市股票组合的价值。
伯克希尔的股东可以放心：我们将永远把绝大部分资金配置在股票上——主要是美国股票，尽管其中许多企业拥有重要的国际业务。伯克希尔永远不会偏好持有现金等价资产而非优质企业，无论是控股还是部分持股。
如果财政失策盛行，纸币的价值就可能蒸发。在某些国家，这种鲁莽做法已成习惯；而在我们国家短暂的历史中，美国也曾多次逼近悬崖边缘。固定利率债券完全无法抵御货币失控。
然而，只要这个国家的人民需要其产品或服务，企业以及拥有稀缺才能的个人通常都能找到应对货币不稳定的方法。个人技能也是如此。由于缺乏卓越的运动能力、美妙的嗓音、医疗或法律技能，乃至任何特殊天赋，我一生都不得不依赖股票。实际上，我一直依靠美国企业的成功，并将继续如此。
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无论如何，公民储蓄的理性——乃至更具想象力的——配置，是推动社会不断增长所需商品和服务产出的必要条件。这个体系被称为资本主义。它有缺陷和滥用——某些方面甚至比以前更严重——但它也能创造出其他经济体系无法比拟的奇迹。
美国就是最好的例子。我们国家仅仅 235 年的发展历程，即使是 1789 年《宪法》通过、国家活力被释放时最乐观的殖民者也难以想象。
诚然，我们国家在建国初期有时会从国外借债来补充本国储蓄。但与此同时，我们需要大量美国人持续储蓄，随后还需要这些储蓄者或其他美国人明智地配置这些可用资本。如果美国把所有产出都消费掉，这个国家将原地踏步。
美国的发展历程并不总是光鲜亮丽——我们这个国家一直有许多恶棍和推销员，企图利用那些误将储蓄托付给他们的人。但即使存在这种不法行为（直至今日依然猖獗），以及大量因残酷竞争或颠覆性创新而最终失败的资本配置，美国人的储蓄仍然带来了殖民者做梦都想不到的产出数量和质量。
从只有四百万人口起步——尽管早期经历了一场残酷的内战，让美国人自相残杀——美国还是在宇宙一眨眼间改变了世界。
伯克希尔的股东们，以一种微小的方式，通过放弃股息、选择再投资而非消费，参与到了美国的奇迹中。最初，这种再投资微不足道，几乎毫无意义，但随着时间的推移，它像蘑菇一样迅速膨胀，折射出持续的储蓄文化与长期复利的神奇力量交织的结果。
如今，伯克希尔的业务触及美国各个角落。而且我们还没结束。公司因多种原因消亡，但不同于人类的命运，高龄本身并不致命。今天的伯克希尔比1965年时年轻得多。
然而，正如查理和我一直承认的，伯克希尔无法在除了美国以外的任何地方取得这样的成就；而即使伯克希尔从未存在过，美国依然会取得它已有的每一点成功。
所以，谢谢你，山姆大叔。总有一天，你在伯克希尔的侄女侄儿们希望给你送来的款项比2024年还要多。请明智地花这些钱。照顾那些并非因自身过错而在生活中抽到下下签的许多人，他们理应得到更好的待遇。永远不要忘记，我们需要你维持货币稳定，而这一结果需要你的智慧和警觉。
财产-意外保险
P/C保险仍然是伯克希尔的核心业务。这个行业遵循一种在大型企业中罕见——非常罕见——的财务模式。
通常，企业在销售产品或服务之前（或同时）就要承担人工、原材料、库存、厂房设备等成本。因此，CEO们在销售之前就能清楚了解产品的成本。如果售价低于成本，管理者很快就会发现问题。现金不断流失，是难以忽视的。
但在承保P/C保险时，我们提前收到保费，很久以后才知道我们的产品花了多少钱——有时这个真相大白时刻会推迟30年或更久。（我们至今仍在为50多年前发生的石棉风险敞口支付大额赔偿。）
这种运营模式有一个可取的效果：在产生大部分费用之前，P/C保险公司就能拿到现金，但同时也伴随着风险：公司可能在CEO和董事意识到发生了什么之前就已经在亏损——有时是巨额亏损。
某些险种可以最大程度地减少这种错配，比如农作物保险或冰雹险，这类损失很快就能报告、评估和赔付。但另一些险种则可能让高管和股东在公司走向破产时还洋洋自得——想想医疗事故险或产品责任险。在“长尾”险种中，一家P/C保险公司可能向所有者和监管机构报告多年（甚至几十年）的巨大但虚假的利润。如果CEO是个乐观派或是个骗子，这种会计尤其危险。这些可能性并非虚构：历史揭示了大量这两种人。
近几十年来，这种“先收钱、后赔款”的模式让伯克希尔得以投资大笔资金（“浮存金”），同时总体上实现了我们认为的少量承保利润。我们为“意外”做了估算，到目前为止，这些估算都是充分的。
我们没有被业务中持续出现的巨大且不断增长的赔款所吓倒。（我写这段话时，想想山火吧。）我们的工作就是合理定价以吸收这些损失，并在意外发生时冷静地承受打击。我们的工作还包括对抗“失控”的判决、虚假诉讼和彻头彻尾的欺诈行为。
在阿吉特的领导下，我们的保险业务已从奥马哈一家默默无闻的公司成长为全球领导者，既以敢于承担风险著称，又拥有直布罗陀般稳固的财务实力。此外，格雷格、各位董事和我本人在伯克希尔的投资规模，相对于我们所获得的任何薪酬而言都相当巨大。我们不使用期权或其他单向的薪酬形式；如果你亏钱，我们同样亏钱。这种做法鼓励谨慎，但并不能保证远见。
财产/意外险的增长依赖于经济风险的增加。没有风险——就不需要保险。
回想仅仅135年前，世界上还没有汽车、卡车或飞机。如今仅美国就有3亿辆机动车，这个庞大的车队每天造成巨大的损害。由飓风、龙卷风和野火造成的财产损失规模庞大、持续增长，且其模式和最终成本越来越难以预测。
为这些风险承保十年期保单将是愚蠢的——甚至可以说是疯狂的——但我们相信，承担一年的此类风险通常是可控的。如果我们改变想法，也会相应调整我们提供的合同。在我有生之年，汽车保险公司普遍放弃了年度保单，转而采用六个月的保单。这一变化减少了浮存金，但使得承销更加明智。
没有哪家私营保险公司愿意承担像伯克希尔所能提供的风险规模。有时，这一优势至关重要。但我们也需要在价格不足时收缩业务。绝不能为了留在牌桌上而承保定价不足的保单。那无异于企业自杀。
为财产/意外险合理定价，一半是艺术，一半是科学，绝对不适合乐观主义者。招募阿吉特的伯克希尔高管迈克·戈德伯格说得最到位：“我们希望我们的承销员每天上班时紧张兮兮，但不能瘫痪。”
总体来看，我们喜欢财产/意外险业务。伯克希尔在财务和心理上都能从容应对极端损失。我们也不依赖再保险公司，这赋予了我们一项重要而持久的成本优势。最后，我们拥有出色的管理者（没有乐观主义者），并且特别适合将财产/意外险贡献的大量资金用于投资。
过去二十年，我们的保险业务从承销中产生了320亿美元的税后利润，约为每美元保费收入的税后3.3美分。与此同时，我们的浮存金从460亿美元增长到1710亿美元。浮存金未来可能还会小幅增长，并且凭借明智的承销（加上一些运气），有合理机会实现零成本。
伯克希尔增持日本投资
我们以美国为中心的投资中，有一个虽小但重要的例外，那就是我们在日本不断增长的投资。
自伯克希尔开始购买五家日本公司股票以来，已经过去了将近六年。这些公司的运作方式与伯克希尔自身颇为相似，且非常成功。这五家公司（按字母顺序）是：伊藤忠商事（ITOCHU）、丸红（Marubeni）、三菱（Mitsubishi）、三井（Mitsui）和住友（Sumitomo）。这些大型企业各自拥有众多业务的权益，其中许多业务位于日本，但也有一些遍布全球。
伯克希尔于2019年7月首次购入这五家公司的股票。我们当时只是查看了它们的财务记录，便对其股票的低廉价格感到惊讶。随着时间推移，我们对这些公司的钦佩之情与日俱增。格雷格曾多次与他们会面，我也经常关注它们的进展。我们两人都喜欢它们的资本配置方式、管理层以及对待投资者的态度。
这五家公司都会在适当时机增加股息，在合理时回购股份，而且它们的高管在薪酬计划上远没有美国同行那么激进。
我们对这五家公司的持仓都是超长期持有，并承诺支持它们的董事会。从一开始，我们也同意将伯克希尔对每家公司的持股比例控制在10%以下。但随着我们接近这一上限，这五家公司同意适度放宽这一天花板。随着时间的推移，你很可能会看到伯克希尔对五家公司的持股比例均有所增加。
年末，伯克希尔的总成本（以美元计）为138亿美元，持仓市值总计235亿美元。
与此同时，伯克希尔一直——但并非遵循任何固定公式——在增加以日元计价的借款。这些借款均采用固定利率，没有“浮动利率”品种。Greg和我对未来汇率走势没有观点，因此寻求接近货币中性的头寸。但根据美国通用会计准则，我们必须定期在收益中确认所借日元的任何损益计算结果；在年末，由于美元走强，我们确认了23亿美元的税后收益，其中8.5亿美元发生在2024年。
我预计Greg及其最终继任者将持有这些日本头寸数十年之久，伯克希尔未来还将找到其他方式与这五家公司进行富有成效的合作。
我们同样喜欢当前日元平衡策略的数学计算结果。在我撰写这封信时，预计2025年从日本投资中获得的年度股息收入总计约为8.12亿美元，而日元债务的利息成本约为1.35亿美元。
奥马哈年度盛会
我希望你能在5月3日来奥马哈与我们相聚。今年我们遵循了略有调整的日程安排，但基本内容保持不变。我们的目标是让你得到许多问题的解答，让你与朋友相聚，并让你带着对奥马哈的美好印象离开。这座城市期待你的到来。
我们将有同样一群志愿者为你提供品类丰富的伯克希尔产品，这些产品会掏空你的钱包，但也会点亮你的一天。和往常一样，我们将在周五中午12点至下午5点营业，届时会有可爱的Squishmallows、Fruit of the Loom的内衣、Brooks跑鞋以及众多其他商品供你选购。
同样，我们只销售一本书。去年我们推出了《穷查理宝典》，并销售一空——5000册在周六营业结束前就卖光了。
今年我们将推出《伯克希尔哈撒韦60年》。2015年，我请Carrie Sova（她的众多职责中包括管理年会的大量活动）尝试编写一部轻松愉快的伯克希尔历史。我让她充分发挥想象力，她很快便完成了一本书，其创意、内容和设计都让我惊叹不已。
后来，Carrie离开伯克希尔去组建家庭，现在有了三个孩子。但每年夏天，伯克希尔办公室的员工都会聚在一起观看奥马哈风暴追逐者队对阵一支三A级对手的棒球比赛。我会邀请一些前同事加入，Carrie通常也会带着家人一起来。在今年这场活动中，我厚着脸皮问她是否愿意制作一本60周年纪念特辑，收录Charlie很少公开的照片、语录和故事。
尽管要照顾三个年幼的孩子，Carrie还是立刻答应了。因此，我们准备了5000册新书，将在周五下午以及周六上午7点至下午4点出售。
Carrie拒绝为这本新的“Charlie”特辑所付出的大量工作收取任何报酬。我建议，她和我共同签名20册，赠送给任何向Stephen Center捐款5000美元的股东——该中心服务于南奥马哈无家可归的成人和儿童。Kizer家族，从我的老朋友、Carrie的祖父老Bill Kizer开始，几十年来一直在帮助这家值得尊敬的机构。通过销售这20册签名书筹集的任何款项，我都会进行等额配捐。
Becky Quick 将为大家报道我们这次稍作调整的周六聚会。Becky 对伯克希尔了如指掌，而且总能安排出与经理人、投资者、股东乃至偶尔到场的名流之间妙趣横生的访谈。她和 CNBC 的团队干得非常出色，既向全球直播我们的会议，又存档了大量伯克希尔相关的资料。存档这个主意要归功于我们的董事 Steve Burke。
今年我们不播放电影，而是提前到早上8点开会。我会先做几句开场白，然后直接进入问答环节，由 Becky 和现场观众交替提问。
Greg 和 Ajit 将和我一起回答问题，上午10:30我们会休息半小时。11:00重新开时，只有 Greg 陪我坐在台上。今年我们下午1点结束会议，但展区购物一直开放到下午4点。
周末活动的完整细节见第16页。请特别留意周日早上一直很受欢迎的布鲁克斯跑。（我那时在睡觉。）
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我那位聪明又漂亮的妹妹 Bertie（去年我写过她）将和她的两个女儿一起来参会，她们俩同样漂亮。所有观察者一致认为，制造出这种耀眼效果的基因只能来自母系家族。（呜呜。）
Bertie 今年91岁，我们每周日都会用老式电话通话聊天。我们聊老年生活的乐趣，讨论比如各自拐杖的相对优劣这类激动人心的话题。就我而言，拐杖的作用仅限于避免摔个嘴啃泥。
但 Bertie 总能压我一头，她说她还有额外的好处：她告诉我，当女人拄着拐杖时，男人们就不会再“搭讪”她了。Bertie 的解释是，男性的自尊心使得拄拐杖的小老太太根本不是合适的追求目标。目前我还没有数据来反驳她的论断。
但我心存怀疑。开会时我在台上看不太清楚，如果参会者能帮我留意一下 Bertie，我会很感激。告诉我那根拐杖是否真的管用。我打赌她周围一定围满了男性。对于某个年龄段的人来说，这个画面会让人想起《乱世佳人》中的斯嘉丽·奥哈拉和她那帮男性仰慕者。
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伯克希尔的董事们和我都非常欢迎大家来到奥马哈，我预测你们会度过愉快的时光，而且很可能会结识一些新朋友。
2025年2月22日
沃伦·E·巴菲特
董事会主席
伯克希尔业绩 vs. 标普500
| 年份 | 年度百分比变化 | |
| 伯克希尔每股市场价值 | 含股息标普500 | |
| 1965 | 49.5% | 10.0% |
| 1966 | (3.4) | (11.7) |
| 1967 | 13.3 | 30.9 |
| 1968 | 77.8 | 11.0 |
| 1969 | 19.4 | (8.4) |
| 1970 | (4.6) | 3.9 |
| 1971 | 80.5 | 14.6 |
| 1972 | 8.1 | 18.9 |
| 1973 | (2.5) | (14.8) |
| 1974 | (48.7) | (26.4) |
| 1975 | 2.5 | 37.2 |
| 1976 | 129.3 | 23.6 |
| 1977 | 46.8 | (7.4) |
| 1978 | 14.5 | 6.4 |
| 1979 | 102.5 | 18.2 |
| 1980 | 32.8 | 32.3 |
| 1981 | 31.8 | (5.0) |
| 1982 | 38.4 | 21.4 |
| 1983 | 69.0 | 22.4 |
| 1984 | (2.7) | 6.1 |
| 1985 | 93.7 | 31.6 |
| 1986 | 14.2 | 18.6 |
| 1987 | 4.6 | 5.1 |
| 1988 | 59.3 | 16.6 |
| 1989 | 84.6 | 31.7 |
| 1990 | (23.1) | (3.1) |
| 1991 | 35.6 | 30.5 |
| 1992 | 29.8 | 7.6 |
| 1993 | 38.9 | 10.1 |
| 1994 | 25.0 | 1.3 |
注：数据为日历年数据，以下例外：1965年和1966年截至9月30日；1967年为截至12月31日的15个月。
年度百分比变化
| 年份 | 伯克希尔每股市场价值 | 含股息标普500 |
| 1995 | 57.4% | 37.6% |
| 1996 | 6.2 | 23.0 |
| 1997 | 34.9 | 33.4 |
| 1998 | 52.2 | 28.6 |
| 1999 | (19.9) | 21.0 |
| 2000 | 26.6 | (9.1) |
| 2001 | 6.5 | (11.9) |
| 2002 | (3.8) | (22.1) |
| 2003 | 15.8 | 28.7 |
| 2004 | 4.3 | 10.9 |
| 2005 | 0.8 | 4.9 |
| 2006 | 24.1 | 15.8 |
| 2007 | 28.7 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (31.8) | (37.0) |
| 2009 | 2.7 | 26.5 |
| 2010 | 21.4 | 15.1 |
| 2011 | (4.7) | 2.1 |
| 2012 | 16.8 | 16.0 |
| 2013 | 32.7 | 32.4 |
| 2014 | 27.0 | 13.7 |
| 2015 | (12.5) | 1.4 |
| 2016 | 23.4 | 12.0 |
| 2017 | 21.9 | 21.8 |
| 2018 | 2.8 | (4.4) |
| 2019 | 11.0 | 31.5 |
| 2020 | 2.4 | 18.4 |
| 2021 | 29.6 | 28.7 |
| 2022 | 4.0 | (18.1) |
| 2023 | 15.8 | 26.3 |
| 2024 | 25.5 | 25.0 |
| 年化复合收益率 – 1965-2024 | 19.9% | 10.4% |
| 累计总收益率 – 1964-2024 | 5,502,284% | 39,054% |